Application and Selection of Nuclear Event Investigation Methods, Tools and Techniques by ZIEDELIS STANISLOVAS & NOEL MARC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPLICATION AND SELECTION OF 
NUCLEAR EVENT INVESTIGATION 
METHODS, TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final Technical Report 
 
Stanislovas Ziedelis, Marc Noel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUR 25243 EN - 2012
 
 
    
 
The mission of the JRC-IET is to provide support for Community policies on both nuclear and 
non-nuclear energy in order to ensure sustainable, secure and efficient energy production, 
distribution and use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Institute for Energy and Transport 
 
Contact information 
Address: Postbus 2, 1755 ZG Petten, the Netherlands 
E-mail: Stanislovas.Ziedelis@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +31-224-565447 
Fax: +31-224-565637 
 
http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
Legal Notice 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers 
to your questions about the European Union 
 
Freephone number (*): 
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or may charge for these calls. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu/ 
 
JRC 68919 
 
EUR 25243 EN
ISBN 978-92-79-23189-6 (pdf)  
ISBN 978-92-79-23188-9 (print)
ISSN 1831-9424 (online)  
ISSN 1018-5593 (print) 
 
doi:10.2790/45453 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 
 
© European Union, 2012 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged 
 
Printed in Luxembourg 
 
 3
List of acronyms and definitions 
 
AEB Accident Evolution and Barrier function 
ASSET Assessment of Safety Significant Event Team 
ATHEANA A Technique for Human Event Analysis 
CAS-HEAR Computer-Aided System for Human Error Analysis and Reduction 
CCDF Conditional Core Damage Frequency 
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability 
CCF Common Cause Failure 
CRT Current Reality Tree 
ECFC Event and Causal Factors Charting 
ESReDA European Safety Reliability and Data Association 
FRAM Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
HF Human Factors 
HFIT Human Factors Investigation Tool 
HOF Human or Organisational Factors 
HPEP Human Performance Evaluation Process 
HPES Human Performance Enhancement System 
HPIP Human Performance Investigation Process 
HRA Human Reliability Analysis 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IE Initiating Event 
IET Institute for Energy and Transport 
INES International Nuclear Event Scale 
IRS Incident Reporting System 
LL Lessons Learned 
MORT Management Oversight and Risk Tree 
MTO Man, Technology, Organisation 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
NRC (United States) Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NUSAC Nuclear Safety Clearinghouse (action of Safety of Present Nuclear Reactors Unit at IET) 
OEF Operating Experience Feedback 
PRCAP Paks Root Cause Analysis Procedure 
PROSPER Peer Review of the effectiveness of the Operational Safety Performance Experience 
Review 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PWR Pressurised Water Reactor 
RCA Root Cause Analysis 
SAR Safety Analysis Report 
SOL Safety through Organisational Learning 
SPNR Safety of Present Nuclear Reactors Unit at IET 
STEP Sequential Timed Events Plotting 
TSO Technical Support Organisation 
WGOE Working Group on Operating Experience 
3CA Control Change Cause Analysis 
 
 4
 
CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................................................... 5 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................... 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 6 
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 9 
2. Objective and scope of the final report ............................................................................................... 9 
3. Methodology of inquiry .................................................................................................................... 10 
4. Analysis of the survey results ........................................................................................................... 13 
4.1. Analysis of basic information on the organisation of event investigations ................................... 14 
4.2. Analysis of information on specific features of RCA methods and tools...................................... 17 
5. General observations regarding existing practices in event investigations ...................................... 24 
6. Bottlenecks in existing event investigation practices ....................................................................... 29 
7. Recommendations............................................................................................................................. 36 
7.1. Methodological recommendations............................................................................................ 36 
7.2. Recommendations for selecting RCA methods and tools......................................................... 38 
7.3. Recommendations for conducting RCA ................................................................................... 45 
8. Conclusions....................................................................................................................................... 46 
9. References......................................................................................................................................... 48 
Annex A1.................................................................................................................................................. 51 
 
 5
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1. Typical composition of an event investigation team ............................................................... 14 
Table 4.2. Breakdown of time spent on different activities during the investigation............................... 15 
Table 4.3. Distribution of responses with regard to the areas benefiting from event investigation ......... 16 
Table 4.4. Methodologies used for nuclear event investigation ............................................................... 16 
Table 4.5. Results of quantitative evaluation of effectiveness of event investigation methods and tools 22 
Table 4.6. Strengths and weaknesses of RCA methods used ................................................................... 23 
Table 4.7. Strengths and weaknesses of RCA tools used ......................................................................... 24 
Table 7.1. Comparison of features of some root cause analysis tools and techniques ............................. 41 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 4.1. Frequency of application of different root cause analysis methods ....................................... 18 
Figure 4.2. Frequency of application of different root cause analysis tools ............................................. 18 
Figure 5.1. General structure of the event investigation process.............................................................. 25 
Figure 5.2. The ‘root’ system of an event................................................................................................. 26 
Figure 5.3. Possible routes of the event investigation process with potential negative impacts .............. 33 
Figure 7.1. Some of the most popular and commonly used root cause analysis methods........................ 37 
Figure 7.2. Some of the most popular and commonly used event investigation tools ............................. 38 
 
 6
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This document is a final report prepared by the European Clearinghouse on Operational Experience 
Feedback at the Joint Research Centre — Institute for Energy and Transport. It presents the results 
obtained in the last phase of a project launched as part of the technical task ‘Comparative study of event 
assessment methodologies with recommendations for an optimised approach in the EU’ in 2010-2011. 
The main goal of this final report is to evaluate existing practices and arrive at some conclusions and 
recommendations that will help in selecting and applying instruments to improve the quality of nuclear 
event investigations. 
Analysis of the responses received to a questionnaire on existing event investigation practices yielded 
the following main findings: 
1. Event investigation teams are typically composed of technical specialists from the departments 
concerned in the plant, professional event investigators and representatives of management. The 
serious shortcoming of current practice in recruiting event investigation teams is that 
psychologists, human factor specialists and external experts/consultants are rarely included in the 
team. 
2. The event investigation process itself has a positive influence on safety for personnel interviewed 
or otherwise involved. Besides the final report and recommendations, involvement in the event 
investigation process seems to be useful in enhancing insight into and attitudes towards safety, 
increasing awareness and improving competencies, and discovering unknown dependencies 
between different functions or departments. 
3. During the last ten years event investigation practices have not changed very much as regards the 
use of particular methods and tools. The most frequently used RCA methods at European nuclear 
plants remain HPES, MORT, ASSET and MTO. The choice of RCA tools is heavily restricted 
by their purpose and the needs of the method used; however, the most ‘popular’ ones are basic 
RCA tools (ECFC, barrier analysis, change analysis, task analysis and interviewing), which are 
used in practically all investigations. 
4. In most organisations the same event investigation instruments have been implemented and used 
for a long time (more than 10 years). Usually RCA methods and tools are obtained for free and 
there are no obvious trends towards replacing them with new ones. 
5. To further improve existing practices in event investigation it would be desirable to: 
• develop comprehensive software for further computerising the event investigation process, 
including RCA methods such as HPES and MORT; 
• resume IAEA technical support for the ASSET method; 
• improve the education of event investigators by organising appropriate training, drafting 
simpler manuals and guidelines, and providing more practical examples; 
• organise more intensive exchange of experience among event investigators. 
6. The need for an independent investigation, free from any interference by vested interests (such as 
line management, supervisory authorities, certification bodies or commercial partners), has 
increasingly been recognised on account of its contribution to the overall quality of the 
investigation. However, the principle of the independence of event investigations is not in 
practice considered as an important and necessary feature. 
7. Existing practices demonstrate that event investigations frequently continue to remain focused on 
analysing the direct and immediate causes of events instead of attempting to dig deeper to 
identify latent root causes, such as human, organisational and management-related factors. 
Although the importance of correctly identifying these HOF-related causes is commonly 
understood, there is still a tendency for the analysis to focus solely on the technical issues of the 
event. 
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During this study, some methodological inconsistencies, barriers, bottlenecks and emerging traps in the 
event investigation process were identified and analysed more thoroughly; some methodological and 
practical recommendations were put forward as to how these obstacles could be overcome. 
 
In order to avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings currently surrounding the terms and definitions 
used in event investigation in general, and root cause analysis in particular, several improved definitions 
were suggested. With the aim of better distinguishing between event investigation instruments of 
different levels and applicability, an original system of classification of basic RCA methods and tools 
was suggested. This system should help in comparing characteristics and selecting the most appropriate 
instruments for investigating a particular event. Detailed recommendations for selecting root cause 
analysis methods and tools are also presented. 
 
With a view to explaining possible scenarios leading to event recurrence, the study examined potential 
negative impacts and emerging traps in the event investigation process. Some specific suggestions as to 
how RCA could be conducted more effectively were put forward. 
1. The level of investigation necessary (troubleshooting, apparent cause investigation or root cause 
analysis) should be determined correctly during the event review/screening. Decisions should be 
properly substantiated and based on a set of objective criteria evaluated against clearly defined 
thresholds. Attempts, based on personal opinions, to simplify and speed up the investigation of 
safety-relevant events by avoiding a detailed root cause analysis process should be resisted. 
2. Root cause analyses undertaken on ‘near hits, near misses and close calls’ can be just as 
productive as or even more effective than those done on major incidents. Typically, root causes 
for ‘near hits, near misses and close calls’ are the same as those for major incidents. Only the 
consequences or outcomes differ, and they are the result of luck. 
3. Preparing properly for root cause investigation is an important prerequisite for success. 
Preparatory steps such as establishing and implementing an effective event investigation process 
within the management system, providing appropriate resources, selecting the relevant lead 
investigator, staffing the investigation team with experienced and adequately trained personnel, 
drafting in external experts if required, creating favourable conditions for the investigation and 
protecting it from undue time pressures are necessary to achieve good results. 
4. Identifying and describing root causes for most events requires additional competencies from the 
human and social sciences. These types of competencies are traditionally very rare in a world of 
technicians and engineers and even amongst managers. Including human performance 
engineering specialists, psychologists and/or sociologists in the event investigation team should 
be considered. 
5. A typical mistake in conducting RCA should be avoided — namely concentrating on the direct 
causes or symptoms of a problem instead of the actual root cause, basically because often the 
investigation team stops asking ‘WHY?’ too early. The investigation should not be limited to the 
technical flaw and/or individual failure such as ‘operator error’. It should go far and deep enough 
and cover all organisational levels, including senior management. 
6. The benefits offered by RCA methods and tools using cause categorisation trees, ready-for-use 
universal checklists, computer software based on them and so-called ‘expert systems’ suggesting 
solutions for a given root cause should not be overestimated. Categorisation schemes restrict 
thinking by causing the investigator to stop at the categorical cause. Checklists give people the 
false sense that the correct answer must be among the listed items. Cause categorisation trees and 
computer software based on them create the illusion of finding the best solutions. These 
shortcomings and the disadvantages revealed by operational experience practices should also be 
taken into account during event investigation and offset by thorough evidence-based analysis of 
all causes and their inter-relationships. 
7. All root causes of an event investigated should be identified the first time wherever possible; it is 
cheaper, less painful, and more efficient than discovering only one root cause per problem. 
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8. The degree of independence of the investigation should be increased as much as possible, at least 
by including independent experts in the investigation team. The final outcome of an investigation 
depends on the stakeholders’ confidence in it, which to a certain extent is linked to the 
objectivity, integrity and competence of the investigative body. The appointment of members of 
the investigation team has to find the right trade-off between expertise (i.e. experts who know the 
field and its culture, technical advances and latest modifications, but are liable to lack 
impartiality) and independence (impartial members who have no link with the field, but are liable 
to lack expertise). Investigators (lead and team) require the assurance that taking part in an 
investigation will not harm their careers in any way. 
9. Corrective actions and improvements should be based on reliable root cause analysis results, not 
on guesses and assumptions derived from ineffective shallow investigations like apparent cause 
analysis or troubleshooting. This could help avoid wasting time and resources on short-cut 
investigations and best-guess corrective actions, and improvement programmes will become 
more cost-effective. 
10. Management’s approach to and support for event investigation is essential. Management should 
encourage identification of the real root causes of an event and not limit the investigation to 
lower-ranking personnel or influence the investigation in a particular direction (especially when 
underlying causes of incidents are ultimately supervisory and/or managerial and their 
identification could be uncomfortable). 
 
The effectiveness of the event investigation and operational experience feedback process mostly 
depends on the safety culture of an organisation’s personnel, and of its senior management especially. 
Management should not just pay lip service to safety but demonstrate and confirm their commitment in 
the practical decisions they take during the preparation and conduct of an investigation, in evaluating its 
results and in generating, approving and implementing the corrective actions. 
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1. Introduction 
Learning from experience is acknowledged as one of the pillars of the modern approaches to risk 
management in different industries generating or employing highly concentrated energy flows and thus 
creating high risks for personnel, the public and the environment. Examples of such areas are the 
nuclear, gas, oil, chemical and aviation industries. Investigations and analyses of events in these 
industries are seen as valuable sources of information on safety, and thus constitute important insights 
towards safety improvement. During recent years there has been a surge in the development of 
knowledge and systematic approaches, methodologies and tools to aid the event investigation practices 
adopted within the nuclear industry. However, despite obvious achievements in developing instruments 
for event investigations and the plentiful resources used to implement numerous corrective actions, 
accidents are still occurring and recurring, sometimes on an upward trend. They illustrate multiple 
technical and organisational failures as well as weaknesses in quality management and safety culture, 
including deficiencies in the operational experience feedback process and cases where lessons are not 
fully learned. It is therefore necessary to analyse, evaluate and attempt to improve the quality of event 
investigations with the aim of identifying corrective actions and learning lessons that are better 
substantiated and more able to be practically implemented. 
 
With a view to collecting available information on practical experience with the individual event 
investigation methods and tools currently used in the nuclear industry, a questionnaire [1] was prepared 
and a survey was conducted in 2010-2011. 
In parallel with the survey, an interim report on the topic ‘Comparative analysis of nuclear event 
investigation methods, tools and techniques’ was prepared in 2010 [2]. Based on available technical, 
scientific, normative and regulatory documentation, the interim report includes a review and brief 
comparative analysis of information on event investigation methods, tools and techniques either 
suggested or already used in the nuclear industry. The report identified the advantages and drawbacks of 
the different instruments. 
The aim of the interim report [2] was to serve as a ‘reference guide’ bringing together in one place 
analyses and critiques of the RCA methods and tools that are most commonly used for risk-related 
applications in nuclear power plants. In particular, the scope, underlying models and data, strengths and 
weaknesses, and other characteristics of the methods and tools were investigated so that thoughtful use 
would be made of any method or tool. It was not the intention of this document to offer specific 
judgments about whether various approaches should be used. Such judgments are highly dependent on 
the application and the corresponding needs. Rather, the intent was to provide information relevant to 
making a judgment, given a specific application or if a method/tool is selected for use, as to whether 
compensatory steps might be appropriate to ensure that a limitation of a method/tool does not overly 
impact the results of an analysis. 
2. Objective and scope of the final report 
As part of the technical task ‘Comparative study of event assessment methodologies with 
recommendations for an optimised approach in the EU’ under the NUSAC work programme for 2010–
2011, this scientific research project was launched by the JRC/IE SPNR in 2010. The general objective 
of the project is to conduct background research in support of specific scientific and technical fields that 
are relevant to nuclear safety. Specifically, it aims to improve practice in selecting and using nuclear 
event investigation methods and tools in order to intensify the operational experience feedback process. 
 
The first phase of the project involved compiling, reviewing, comparing and evaluating the most recent 
data on developments in and systematic approaches to nuclear event investigations by organisations 
(mainly utilities) in the EU Member States. 
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During the second phase of the project a survey was conducted in 2010–2011 in order to collect 
information on current event investigation practices in the nuclear industry. 
The present document — the final report on the project — has been prepared on the basis of data 
obtained from the survey [1], the interim report [2] and other available information gained from nuclear 
power plant operational experience. This final report aims to analyse countries’ responses to the survey 
questionnaire, evaluate existing practices and put forward some conclusions and recommendations to 
help in selecting and applying instruments to improve the quality of nuclear event investigations. It is 
intended to provide useful guidance and information for organisations wishing to develop or strengthen 
their capabilities in this area. 
3. Methodology of inquiry 
To perform the survey of practical experience with the event investigation methods and tools currently 
used in the nuclear industry, a questionnaire [1] was developed. Questions were formulated with the aim 
of covering the most important features of the methods and tools used, in order to evaluate their 
effectiveness and usability, and also taking into account experience gained when performing other 
surveys relating to event investigations [2, 3-14]. The questionnaire can be found in Annex A1 to this 
report. It comprised 47 questions divided into three parts. 
The first part of the questionnaire was aimed at collecting personal and background information, namely 
basic information on the specialists participating in nuclear event investigations and how this activity is 
managed in various countries. The questions in the first part were as follows: 
1. Name, address and country of the organisation responding to the questionnaire. 
2. Name, position and e-mail address of the person completing the questionnaire. 
3. Number of years employed as an incident investigator. 
4. How long (number of years) did you work in the nuclear/nuclear safety area before you became 
an event investigator? 
5. Percentage of your total working time devoted to incident investigations and associated 
activities. 
6. Number of incident investigations in which you have been involved. 
7. Have you received formal training in event investigation/root cause analysis methods? If so, 
please specify the type and duration of the course. 
8. Number of investigators typically participating in an event investigation in your organisation. 
9. What is the most common composition of an investigation team (please specify roles, functions, 
positions). 
10. Are external specialists (outside experts/consultants from other organisations, corporate 
investigators from the utility’s central department) involved in establishing/performing event 
investigations in your organisation? 
11. Average duration of an event investigation in your organisation (days) (limited apparent 
cause/specialist/supervisor’s investigations of near-misses and low-level events should not be 
taken into account). 
12. Time spent on different activities during the investigation, such as planning, data collection, 
analysis, drafting recommendations/corrective actions, writing the report (as a percentage of the 
overall duration of the investigation). 
13. Who initiates the investigation in your organisation (investigators themselves, plant 
management, regulatory organisation, others — e.g. plant committee, commission, group), or is 
it started automatically as required by the relevant procedure if preconditions are fulfilled? 
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14. Please evaluate the following (using the scale ‘insufficient’ 1-2-3-4-5 ‘adequate’): 
• Human resources (personnel available to conduct an investigation); 
• Time available to perform a good quality investigation; 
• Managers’ support for investigations; 
• Availability of investigation guidelines/manuals/method (tool) descriptions/software to 
support the investigation. 
15. Do you feel that the investigation can be conducted objectively and free of pressures aiming to 
influence the investigation in a particular direction? If not, please explain why. 
16. In your opinion, what influence on safety does the event investigation process itself have for 
personnel interviewed or otherwise involved (over and above the final report and 
recommendations)? (Enhanced insight into and attitudes towards safety, increased awareness and 
improved competencies, discovery of unknown dependencies between different functions or 
departments, etc. should be considered.) 
17. In what area(s) has the event investigation been most beneficial for your plant/organisation: (a) 
reducing maintenance costs; (b) improving equipment availability; (c) improving equipment 
reliability; (d) reducing operating costs; (e) increasing nuclear safety; (f) improving 
environmental protection, (g) other (please specify). 
18. Are there national regulatory requirements of any sort regulating event investigation in your 
organisation? If so, please provide the references of the latest edition of the relevant document 
(please attach a copy of document or indicate the internet address, if possible). 
19. What international/foreign requirements/guides do you use for event investigation in your 
organisation? (please give references or the internet address if possible). 
20. Which methodologies are used for event investigation in your organisation? Please tick one or 
more as appropriate: (a) root cause analysis — RCA; (b) probabilistic safety assessment — PSA; 
(c) deterministic safety analysis; (d) safety culture assessment; (e) other. 
The second part of the questionnaire was aimed at collecting information about current practices, in 
order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of root cause analysis approaches, methods and tools used 
by nuclear industry organisations for nuclear event investigation. The questions in this part were as 
follows: 
1. Which root cause analysis (RCA) method(s) have you used for event investigation in your 
organisation? 
2. Which RCA tools and techniques have been used for event investigation in your organisation? 
3. How were the RCA methods and tools currently used for event investigation in your organisation 
acquired (obtained for free; purchased from a vendor; developed internally; obtained and then 
adopted)? 
4. If you have developed any new or existing RCA methods/tools in your organisation, please 
specify the method/tool and briefly describe the development(s). 
5. For how long have the RCA methods and tools been used in your organisation (years)? 
6. What factors determined your choice of RCA methods and tools? (a) recommendations of the 
IAEA, WANO; (b) suggestions of the national regulatory body; (c) suggestions of management 
of your organisation; (d) suggestions of experienced colleagues; (e) recommendations in 
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literature (please indicate source); (f) your previous experience; (g) there was no need for choice 
— you used methods and tools which were in place in your organisation. 
7. What is the degree of methodological definition of RCA methods used for event investigation in 
your organisation: (a) well defined; (b) loosely defined; (c) not defined (no methodology — 
collection of concepts). 
8. Is your organisation currently considering changing the RCA method/tool used? (a) yes; (b) no; 
(c) don’t know. If yes, please indicate the reason for your new choice. 
9. Please evaluate the extent to which RCA methods and tools used for event investigation in your 
organisation meet the following criteria: 
9.1. Clear definition of the problem and its significance for safety. 
9.2. Clear delineation of the known causal relationships that combined to cause the problem. 
9.3. Ability to identify and to establish clearly the causal relationships and interdependencies 
between the causal factors, the root causes and the problem defined. 
9.4. Clear presentation of the evidence used to support the existence of identified causes. 
9.5. Clear substantiation of the solutions (proposed corrective measures) and explanation of how 
they will prevent the problem recurring. 
9.6. Ability to document clearly criteria B9.1 to B9.5 listed above in a final RCA report so others 
can easily follow the logic of the analysis. 
9.7. Availability of a mechanism for testing logic in establishing and analysing causal 
relationships and interdependencies. 
9.8. Time needed for constructing an event evolution model (chart, tree, and diagram). 
9.9. Accuracy required for constructing an event evolution model (chart, tree, and diagram). 
9.10. Extent of influence of subjectivity and emotions on output. 
9.11. Suitability to address complex system-wide issues (without need to involve other RCA 
methods and tools). 
9.12. Extent of training and professional expertise needed for the RCA method to be mastered. 
9.13. Level of automation, i.e. availability of specific software for creating charts/diagrams, 
categorisation, analysing causes, performing integrity checks, generating reports (universal 
software, such as MS Office, is not taken into account). 
9.14. The potential level of scope of the investigation — suitability to analyse events, 
influenced by: 1 — the work and technological system; 2 — the staff level; 3 — the 
management level; 4 — the company level; 5 — the regulator and association level; 6 — the 
government level. 
9.15. How would you rate the effectiveness of the RCA methods/tools used? 
The third and last part of the questionnaire contained four questions requesting some additional 
information: 
1. What other strengths and weaknesses of RCA methods and tools used could you indicate? 
2. What further needs and suggestions for the development or improvement of RCA methods and 
tools could you indicate? 
3. Any other comments concerning existing event investigation practices. 
4. Please give your overall opinion and any suggestions concerning this questionnaire. 
 13
The questionnaire was sent to 79 addressees representing nuclear power plants, regulatory bodies, 
technical support organisations, and research or consulting institutions mainly in the EU Member States. 
The list of addressees was drawn up based on their participation in several workshops recently held by 
the Institute for Energy and Transport and/or the IAEA in the field of event investigation, root cause 
analysis and human and organisational factors. Some individual experts directly participating in nuclear 
event investigation or involved in developing relevant investigation methods and tools were also 
included. 
4. Analysis of the survey results 
The response rate was relatively low. Only 22 responses with adequately filled-in questionnaires from 
13 countries were received. These were Bulgaria: 2, Serbia: 1, Hungary: 1, Slovenia: 2, Spain: 3, Czech 
Republic: 1, Sweden: 2, Switzerland: 1, United Kingdom: 1, Lithuania: 1, Slovakia: 3, US: 1, Finland: 3. 
Some questions were found by some respondents to be too difficult or unclear to answer: several 
respondents (6 out of 22) failed to complete the entire questionnaire, leaving some important questions 
unanswered (especially regarding the qualitative evaluation of RCA methods and tools used against 
selected criteria). 
The relatively low number of responses received and the low quality of feedback information provided 
could be explained by the following main reasons: 
1. In some countries individual event investigators at the utilities are not authorised to respond to such 
surveys without harmonising the data to be provided with management and/or national nuclear 
safety regulatory authorities. In such cases only one response to the questionnaire from the country 
concerned could be prepared containing data based on the official approach to event investigations. 
2. Preparation of reasonable answers to all questions contained in the questionnaire took too much time 
and required adequate qualifications and experience in event investigations. 
3. Survey participants lacked motivation to fill in the questionnaire. 
4. Unsuccessful selection of survey participants: some of the responses seem to have been prepared by 
people responsible for operational experience feedback but not really involved in event 
investigations. If persons trying to fill in the questionnaire have not taken an active part in routine 
event investigations (typical for personnel of regulatory bodies in most countries), the information 
provided sometimes seems to be of low value. 
According to the answers given, the responses to the questionnaire were prepared by event investigators 
having on average 8.2 years experience in event investigations. The minimum time spent as an event 
investigator is 2 years, and the maximum 25 years. Before becoming event investigators, these people 
worked in the nuclear or nuclear safety area for an average of 10.5 years; however, 4 cases exist where 
persons were appointed to the event investigation group without any previous experience in the nuclear 
safety area. The percentage of total working time of respondents devoted to incident investigations and 
associated activities varies between 10 and 100 per cent (53.3 % on average). 
The total number of event investigations performed with the involvement of each respondent during 
his/her career ranges from 8 to 600 (100.3 on average). Each investigator took part in 15.4 event 
investigations per year (the minimum number of events investigated per year is 0.5, and the maximum 
80). This difference is puzzling and raises additional questions about the correctness of answers 
provided. Statements about hundreds of root cause investigations performed in some specific nuclear 
power plant and dozens (30-80) of events per year analysed with the personal participation of a 
particular investigator do not look very convincing. A possible reason for such inconsistency could lie in 
the different understanding and treatment of the term ‘root cause analysis’. Some people and 
organisations report a lot of events investigated using RCA; however, most of these events (especially 
low-level events and ‘near misses’) are actually analysed using apparent cause analysis or 
troubleshooting but not RCA. Operational experience shows that a specific nuclear power plant is able 
to perform not more than 3-5 comprehensive root cause analysis investigations (up to 10 at most) per 
year due to the relatively limited resources available for this activity [16]. 
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4.1. Analysis of basic information on the organisation of event 
investigations 
An average of 6.3 investigators usually participates in event investigations, although this number ranges 
from 1 (minimum) to 20 (maximum). Most of the investigators responding to the questionnaire state that 
they have received formal training in event investigation/root cause analysis methods (16 out of 18). 
However, the prevailing form of training for most respondents is participation in workshops (duration 3-
5 days and sometimes even 2 days) organised by the IAEA or other specialised organisations providing 
training of this type. Questions about the extent and content of training, the appropriateness of the 
existing training system and future training needs in the area of event investigation/root cause analysis 
methods, tools and techniques remain topical and should be considered in future. 
 
Data on the typical composition of event investigation teams are presented in Table 4.1. These show that 
an event investigation group most frequently consists of technical specialists from the plant’s 
departments concerned (experts, engineers, technicians, operators, supervisors), event investigators and 
representatives of management. Only four respondents state that the plant’s nuclear and/or radiation 
safety officers or inspectors from the regulatory body take part in the event investigations. Prevailing 
practice, in that psychologists, human factor specialists and also external experts/consultants are rarely 
included in the event investigation team, could be regarded as a serious shortcoming. Two assumptions 
can be derived from these data: 
• The principle of the independence of event investigations [17, 18] is not considered as an 
important and necessary attribute. 
• Technical issues are considered to be a much more important area for finding root causes 
of events than potential human factor problems. 
 
Table 4.1. Typical composition of an event investigation team 
 
 Position or functions of members of the event investigation 
team 
Number of 
responses 
% of total 
1.  Representatives of management (reactor or production managers, 
chief engineers, heads of division/department) 
8 38 
2.  Investigators/event analysis experts (including members of 
operational experience office/group and corrective actions review 
committee)  
17 81 
3.  Nuclear and/or radiation safety officers 4 19 
4.  Specialists representing the plant’s departments concerned 
(experts, engineers, technicians, operators, supervisors) 
19 90.5 
5.  Inspectors from the regulatory body (including resident inspectors, 
INES/IRS national coordinators and officers) 
4 19 
6.  Psychologists, human factor experts 4 19 
7.  External experts/consultants 1 5 
 
Depending on the type of incident, external experts/consultants from other organisations are sometimes 
invited to participate in the investigation (11 cases out of 19). Six responses state that external 
experts/consultants from other organisations are ‘never’ involved in the investigation, and only two 
reply ‘always’. It is even rarer to include corporate investigators from the utility’s central department in 
the event investigation team: 12 respondents say ‘never’ and only 6 say ‘sometimes’, depending on the 
type of incident. 
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If limited apparent cause/specialist/supervisor’s investigations of near-misses and low-level events are 
not taken into account, the average duration of an event investigation in different organisations is up to 
32.8 days depending on the type of event. However, considerable disparities exist: the minimum 
duration of the investigation could be only 3 days and the maximum duration up to 100 days. This result 
also illustrates the fact that some event investigators do not differentiate their activities properly between 
RCA, apparent cause analysis and troubleshooting. 
 
Most respondents agree on the typical breakdown of time spent on different activities during the 
investigation (Table 4.2). Analysis of the data gathered takes up the most time: from 20 % to 65 % 
(36.1 % on average). The second biggest time-consuming activity is data collection, which takes 5-50 % 
of the time (25.8 % on average). Other stages of the investigation also take considerable time: planning: 
8.3 %; drafting recommendations/corrective actions: 16.2 %; writing the report: 12.9 % on average. 
 
Table 4.2. Breakdown of time spent on different activities during the investigation 
 
 Stages of event investigation Time spent, 
% of total 
1. Planning 8.3 
2. Data collection  25.8 
3. Analysis 36.1 
4. Drafting recommendations/corrective actions 16.2 
5. Writing report 12.9 
 
Event investigation in most organisations is started automatically as required by a particular validated 
plant procedure if preconditions are fulfilled (according to the responses of 12 recipients). Sometimes it 
is also initiated by the plant management (8 responses), the regulatory body (6 responses), the plant 
committee, commission or group (6 responses) and even by investigators themselves (4 responses). 
 
Evaluations of the resources available to conduct investigations (using the scale ‘insufficient’ 1-2-3-4-5 
‘adequate’) show that investigation teams are on average satisfactorily or well endowed with human 
resources (average evaluation 3.5) and enough time is allowed to perform the investigation (average 
evaluation 3.6). Management’s support for the investigation is also rated as ‘sufficient’ or ‘good’ 
(average evaluation 3.7) as is the availability of investigation guidelines/manuals/descriptions/software 
to support the investigation (average evaluation 3.8). However, evaluations vary considerably from 
country to country. 
 
Most respondents (20 out of 22) expressed the opinion that in their organisations events can be 
investigated objectively and free of pressures aiming to influence the investigation in a particular 
direction. Only two respondents disagreed. Explaining the reasons for their negative answer, one of the 
respondents accurately pinpointed one of the fundamental problems of event investigations: ‘More 
serious or “unfavourable” findings or identified causes not comfortable to the plant management may 
be refused as “unacceptable”’. Another respondent didn’t explain the reason for his negative answer, 
stating that ‘This kind of question should be anonymous’. It seems from these answers that some of the 
data provided in responses to the questionnaire cannot be considered reliable if respondents do not feel 
independent from management and/or the regulatory body. 
 
It is common ground among all participants in the survey that the event investigation process itself has a 
positive influence on safety for personnel interviewed or otherwise involved. Besides the final report 
and recommendations, being involved in the event investigation process can be useful in enhancing 
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insight into and attitudes towards safety, increasing awareness and improving competencies, and 
discovering unknown dependencies between different functions or departments, etc. 
 
Data provided in the answers to the questionnaire demonstrate that for a particular plant/organisation the 
event investigation has been most beneficial in improving equipment reliability (11 responses) and 
increasing nuclear safety (18 responses). Some of the respondents do not distinguish between specific 
areas, asserting that all the areas mentioned (including reducing maintenance costs, improving 
equipment availability, reducing operating costs, improving environmental protection) are almost always 
influenced positively. Such important areas as staff and management safety culture, personnel 
performance and human factors also benefit (see Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3. Distribution of responses with regard to the areas benefiting from event 
investigation 
 
 Areas benefiting from event investigation  Number of 
responses 
1.  Reducing maintenance costs 4 
2. Improving equipment availability 10 
3. Improving equipment reliability 11 
4. Reducing operating costs 3 
5. Increasing nuclear safety 18 
6. Improving environmental protection 5 
7. Other: staff & management safety culture, personnel performance 
and human factors 
5 
 
Event investigations in most organisations are performed in accordance with national regulatory 
requirements (17 responses out of 21). Relevant international/foreign requirements/guides are also 
widely used (17 responses out of 19). IAEA, US NRC, WENRA, WANO and INPO documents are most 
frequently used. 
 
Based on an accepted classification system of event investigation methodologies, methods and tools [2], 
data on the most frequently used methodologies are presented in Table 4.4. Based on the absolute 
majority of responses, root cause analysis remains the leading methodology for nuclear event 
investigations. Since probabilistic safety assessment, deterministic safety analysis and safety culture 
assessment are also mentioned in some responses, they are mostly employed in pursuit of objectives 
other than routine event investigation or as complementary instruments to RCA. 
 
Table 4.4. Methodologies used for nuclear event investigation 
 
 Event investigation methodologies  Number of 
responses 
1.  Root cause analysis 21 
2.  Probabilistic safety assessment 9 
3.  Deterministic safety analysis 6 
4.  Safety culture assessment 7 
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4.2. Analysis of information on specific features of RCA methods and tools 
The importance of differentiating between event investigation methodologies, methods, tools and 
techniques is demonstrated in [2]. The lack of an agreed system of definitions to differentiate them 
makes it impossible to objectively compare their characteristics and select the most effective instruments 
on a logical basis. With a view to comparing the particular features of event investigation instruments of 
the same level, the suggested classification system distinguishing RCA methodology and methods from 
tools (see Fig. 2.1.1 and Fig. 3.1 in [2]) was followed. 
 
Asking which root cause analysis method(s) had been used for event investigation in specific 
organisations, respondents were offered 18 methods to choose from. They are: HPES — Human 
Performance Enhancement System; HPIP — Human Performance Investigation Process; HPEP — 
Human Performance Evaluation Process; MORT — Management Oversight and Risk Tree; ASSET — 
Assessment of Safety Significant Event Team; PROSPER — Peer Review of the effectiveness of the 
Operational Safety Performance Experience Review process; SOL — Safety through Organisational 
Learning; MTO — Man-Technology-Organisation Investigation; AEB — Accident Evolution and 
Barrier function; STEP — Sequential Timed Events Plotting; PRCAP — Paks Root Cause Analysis 
Procedure; CERCA — a computer-based event investigation method; 3CA — Control Change Cause 
Analysis; HF-RCA — root cause analysis method of the GRS (Germany); GO — method for analysis of 
dynamic systems; DYLAM — Dynamic event Logic Analytical Method; DETAM — Dynamic Event 
Tree Analysis Method; other. 
 
However, only 9 methods out of the 18 suggested were noted as used in practice in the responses 
received. Figure 4.1, showing the frequency of use of different root cause analysis methods, illustrates 
the fact that during the last ten years the existing event investigation practices have not changed very 
much when compared with data presented by the IAEA and WANO in 2002–2008 [17, 19, 20]. 
According to 12 respondents, the most frequently used method at European nuclear plants is event 
investigation based on INPO’s Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES). Other methods 
which are fairly often used are: MORT — Management Oversight and Risk Tree analysis (5 responses), 
the IAEA’s ASSET (4 responses) and MTO (3 responses). The remaining 5 methods (HPIP, SOL, AEB, 
STEP, PRCAP) are used locally in a specific country. 
In order to identify the most frequently used event investigation tools, respondents were invited to 
choose from a list of 22 items. The tools included in the list are: Event and Causal Factors Charting 
(ECFC); Cause and effect analysis; Interviewing; Task analysis; Why-why chart; Pareto analysis; 
Storytelling; Change analysis; Barrier analysis; Fault tree analysis; Event tree analysis; Causal factor 
tree analysis; Kepner-Tregoe problem solving; Human factors investigation tool; Interrelationship 
diagram; Current reality tree; REASON®; PROACT®; REALITYCHARTING®; TAPROOT®; CAS-
HEAR; other. 
 
The results of the survey demonstrate (Figure 4.2) that out of the 22 suggested only 14 tools are really 
used. Some basic event investigation tools are used in practically all investigations. These are: ECFC, 
Barrier analysis, Change analysis, Task analysis and Interviewing. Some other tools seem to be quite 
common: Cause and effect analysis is mentioned in 9 responses, Event tree analysis and Human factors 
investigation tool are mentioned in 8 responses. The remaining few tools (such as Why-why, Pareto 
diagrams, Storytelling, Fault tree analysis and TapRooT®) are used to a limited extent (locally in some 
specific countries/organisations). 
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Figure 4.1. Frequency of application of different root cause analysis methods 
1 — HPES, 2 — HPIP, 3 — MORT, 4 — ASSET, 5 — SOL, 6 — MTO, 7 — AEB, 8 — STEP, 9 — 
PRCAP 
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Figure 4.2. Frequency of application of different root cause analysis tools 
1 — ECFC, 2 — Cause and effect analysis, 3 — Interviewing, 4 — Task analysis, 5 — Why-why, 6 — 
Pareto diagrams, 7 — Storytelling, 8 — Change analysis, 9 — Barrier analysis, 10 — Fault tree 
analysis, 11 — Event tree analysis, 12 — Causal factor tree analysis, 13 — Human factors investigation 
tool, 14 — TapRooT®, 15 — Interrelationship diagram 
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Analysis of the information collected gives rise to some observations: 
1. The classification system for event investigation methods and tools is not perfect. Basic 
(elementary) event investigation tools which are used independently from other ones should be 
distinguished from more complex derivative tools which are based on the combined use of 
several basic (elementary) tools. Examples of basic (elementary) tools could be: Barrier analysis, 
Change analysis, Task analysis, Interviewing, Why-why, Storytelling. The remaining tools listed 
in the questionnaire (e.g. ECFC, TapRooT® and others) seem to belong to the group of complex 
derivative tools. 
2. The differences between these two groups of event investigation tools should be taken into 
account when comparing their prevalence and positive and negative features and giving 
recommendations for their selection and/or usage. 
3. The selection of a particular event investigation method strongly determines the selection of 
appropriate investigation tools and techniques. 
 
Most respondents state that RCA tools currently used for event investigation in their organisation are 
obtained for free (14 responses), obtained for free and then adopted (8 responses) or developed 
internally (9 responses). Only two respondents indicate that their organisation uses RCA tools purchased 
from a vendor. In most organisations the same RCA methods and tools have been used for a long time: 
the average is 14 years. Most investigators assume that the degree of methodological definition of RCA 
methods used for event investigation in their organisation is substantial (16 responses out of 18); 
however, two respondents state that there is no defined methodology — only a collection of concepts is 
used for investigating events. 
 
Survey respondents indicated that the factors which had determined their choice of RCA methods and 
tools include: 
• recommendations of the IAEA, WANO — 7 responses; 
• suggestions of the national regulatory body — 3 responses; 
• suggestions of the organisation’s management — 7 responses; 
• suggestions of experienced colleagues — 6 responses; 
• previous personal experience — 7 responses. 
For 4 respondents there was no need for choice — the methods and tools used were already in place; 
however, nobody made their choice based on recommendations in the literature. Practically all 
respondents (17 out of 18) declared that their organisations were not currently considering changing the 
RCA method/tool used (or respondents were not aware of any such plans). 
Such a conservative approach with regard to the acquisition of new modern event investigation tools 
could be due to several reasons: 
• Investigators are fully satisfied with the effectiveness of event investigation tools already 
in place and they have no demands for new ones. 
• Investigators have insufficient information about the potential advantages of new modern 
event investigation tools and recommendations for their selection and/or usage. 
• Investigators and/or management are not motivated enough to explore the opportunities 
for increasing the quality of event investigations and the effectiveness of the operational 
experience feedback process. 
• Acquisition and implementation of new modern event investigation tools is not 
considered a robust investment of financial and human resources due to the high costs of 
modern computerised commercial tools and the considerable length of time needed for 
training. 
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A summary of respondents’ opinions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of event investigation 
methods and tools used in their organisations is presented in Table 4.5. Survey participants were asked 
to evaluate to what extent particular RCA methods and tools met the 15 selected criteria. They were 
invited to use the scale ‘bad, low’ = 1  2  3  4  5 = ‘excellent, high’. The exception is answers to question 
14, where number 1 represents suitability for analysing events at the level of the work and technological 
system (lowest level), and number 6 represents suitability for analysing events at the highest level — the 
government. 
 
The results presented in Table 4.5 comprise only those event investigation methods and tools which 
were evaluated in responses to the questionnaire. Some of the RCA methods and tools proposed for 
evaluation did not elicit responses, so that no information about their effectiveness was received. Most 
respondents were able to evaluate only one or two methods or tools that had been used in their 
organisation. Consequently, the bulk of the RCA methods and tools included in Table 4.5 were 
evaluated by a limited number of respondents (sometimes only 1 or 2), and the amount of data collected 
is not sufficient for statistical analysis. Only the most frequently used method, HPES, was evaluated by 
11 respondents. For this reason, the objectivity of evaluations should not be assumed to be very high. 
 
Comparing RCA methods (see Table 4.5), the most ‘excellent, high’ evaluations were scored by SOL 
and PRCAP (6 highest evaluations each), MORT (4 highest evaluations) and MTO (2 highest 
evaluations). The lowest evaluations were most frequently scored by MTO (4 ‘bad, low’ evaluations), 
AEB (3 ‘bad, low’ evaluations), STEP (2 ‘bad, low’ evaluations), and MORT (1 ‘bad, low’ evaluation). 
However, the highest overall effectiveness was scored by ASSET (4.25 points), MORT, SOL, MTO and 
PRCAP (4.0 points). The most widely used RCA method, HPES, was on average evaluated moderately: 
only two criteria were rated 4.0 or more (clear presentation of the evidence and ability to document 
clearly the definition of the problem, facts, causal relationships and logic of analysis in a final RCA 
report), while its overall effectiveness was rated 3.64. Some evaluations look a little confusing and seem 
to be subjective and not adequately substantiated. For example, methods which are well supported with 
specific software (such as SOL, PRCAP, MORT) are not rated or rated poorly for the level of 
automation, while methods not supported with any software, such as ASSET, are rated quite well. Some 
doubts about the validity of evaluations are also raised by the practically smooth or obviously too-high 
ratings given to some methods against all criteria (e.g. SOL, PRCAP, ASSET). 
 
Comparing features of RCA tools (see Table 4.5) seems to be even more complicated. Only a few 
respondents provided more or less acceptable evaluations of some RCA tools. The most widely used 
RCA tools such as ECFC, task analysis, interviewing, change analysis, and barrier analysis are thus 
evaluated by a few respondents only. The probable reason for this seems to be that these tools are used 
in combination as ECFC, and also their use is compulsory in HPES. It could be assumed that the 
evaluation of HPES provided by most respondents contains an integral rating of the basic RCA tools 
used for carrying out HPES. Another difficulty hindering attempts to compare evaluations received lies 
in the fact that most of the RCA tools rated are used for different purposes and/or employed in specific 
combinations with other tools and methods. Thus, data collected about specific features of particular 
RCA tools are insufficient to make a statistical analysis and draw well substantiated conclusions. 
However, an analysis of the evaluations received can yield some interesting observations. 
1. Most respondents evaluate only one or two particular event investigation methods or tools which 
they use in practice in their organisations. Event investigators are not informed, trained and 
experienced enough to evaluate and compare other RCA methods and tools employed in other 
countries/organisations, including newly developed modern computerised tools. This could be 
regarded as a serious obstacle hindering the dissemination of good practices and operational 
experience feedback. 
2. Some respondents are unduly satisfied with the advantages of a specific method or tool which 
has been in use for a long time in their organisation. For example, in some responses particular 
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methods or tools are evaluated as ‘good’ or ‘ excellent’ against practically all 15 selected criteria 
(see Table 4.5), including those criteria against which an evaluation could not be given (e.g. 
questions 9.7, 9.8, 9.13). 
Besides evaluating them against 15 criteria listed in Table 4.5, some respondents indicated other 
strengths and weaknesses of RCA methods and tools used. The most important of these are presented in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Most of the comments made confirm characteristics of event investigation methods 
and tools already determined by another investigators and practitioners [2]. 
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Table 4.5. Results of quantitative evaluation of effectiveness of event investigation methods and tools 
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Criteria Evaluations (average values) 
1. Clear definition of the problem and its significance for safety  3.45 4.0 4.25 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 2 2 4.0 
2.  Clear delineation of the known causal relationships that combined to cause the 
problem 
3.64 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 2 1 3.5 
3.  Ability to identify and to establish clearly the causal relationships and inter-
dependencies between the causal factors, the root causes and the problem defined 
3.64 5.0 4.25 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 3.5 3 2 3.5 
4. Clear presentation of the evidence used to support the existence of identified 
causes 
4.0 4.0 4.25 5.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4 1 3.0 
5. Clear substantiation of the solutions (proposed corrective measures) and 
explanation of how they will prevent the problem recurring 
3.45 4.0 4.75 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 4 3 4.0 
6. Ability to document clearly criteria 1 to 5 listed above in a final RCA report so 
others can easily follow the logic of the analysis  
4.09 4.0 4.25 4.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3 3 3.5 
7. Availability of a mechanism for testing logic in establishing and analysing causal 
relationships and interdependencies  
3.54 4.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 4 4 3.5 
8. Time needed for constructing an event evolution model (chart, tree, diagram) 3.64 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3 5 3.5 
9. Accuracy required for constructing an event evolution model (chart, tree, diagram) 3.64 4.0 4.5 5.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 2.5 4 4 3.5 
10. Extent of influence of subjectivity and emotions on output 3.18 3.0 3.25 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5 5 4.0 
11. Suitability to address complex system-wide issues (without need to involve other 
RCA methods and tools) 
3.54 5.0 4.25 5.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 4.0 2.0 2.5 3 2 2.5 
12. Extent of training and professional expertise needed for the RCA method to be 
mastered  
3.36 4.0 4.3 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 5 3 4.0 
13. Level of automation, i.e. availability of specific software for creating 
charts/diagrams, categorisation, analysing causes, performing integrity checks, 
generating reports  
2.7 2.0 4.0  2.0 2.0 3.0  4.0 3.0 2.5 2 2 3.0 
14. Potential level of scope of the investigation — suitability to analyse events, 
influenced by the work/technological systems, the staff, the management, the 
company, the regulator and the association, or the government 
3.77 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 2 4 2.0 
15. Overall effectiveness of RCA methods/tools used 3.64 4.0 4.25 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 5 4 4.5 
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Respondents submitted a number of suggestions for improving existing practices in event investigation. 
The most important and frequently repeated suggestions are the following: 
• Develop comprehensive software for further computerising the event investigation process (for 
creating charts/diagrams, categorisation, analysing causes, performing integrity checks, 
generating reports). Software to assist the analysis is needed for HPES and MORT. 
• Resume IAEA technical support for the ASSET method. 
• Improve the education of event investigators by organising appropriate training, drafting simpler 
manuals and guidelines, and providing more practical examples. 
• Exchange experience among investigators. 
• Include external specialists, independent investigators and human and organisational factor 
experts in the event investigation teams. 
• The investigation should wherever possible be ordered by persons holding the highest offices in 
the management hierarchy. 
• More efforts during analysis of an event should be put into identifying/defining root causes 
(RCs). A well-defined comprehensive taxonomy of causal factors should be used; however, it 
should be borne in mind that taxonomy cannot always offer the exact cause/causes of an event. 
100 % accuracy in identifying RCs using a specific procedure is not possible. Further ‘manual 
digging’ is therefore necessary. 
• A more standardised and formalised procedure should be developed for event analysis, providing 
specific instructions and steps for the investigation to reduce the influence of the investigator’s 
perception/impression/subjectivity. 
• It is effective to use two or more complementary RCA methods or tools. 
• Management support for investigators is imperative; continuous assessment of those involved in 
the process and in setting corrective/preventive actions is needed. The effectiveness of the 
investigation output directly depends on how correctly the RCA process was applied. 
• Presentation of the event, the results of the investigation and the recommendations developed to 
management is very important. 
 
Table 4.6. Strengths and weaknesses of RCA methods used 
 
RCA 
methods 
used 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Well structured method appropriate for retrospective 
analysis of similar events that tend to recur 
- Appropriate for analysis of a single safety-related 
occurrence 
- No longer supported by IAEA 
- Organisational factors and policies are too 
generalised 
Free, applied quickly, IAEA manual Needs experience and practice, manual not easy 
to follow 
- Well structured 
- Appropriate for analysis of single occurrences and for 
retrospective analysis of similar/recurring events  
- Can be widely used for any type of event 
- No longer supported by IAEA 
ASSET 
Very clear to understand, well structured, wide 
application, easy staff training 
Restricted application for human factor events 
- Clear and logical representation of the event information 
- Appropriate for human and organisational factor-related 
events 
- Time consuming 
- Depends on investigator skills and expertise 
HPES 
- Useful especially when combined for visual 
representation of information 
- Flexible and logical and helps investigator to consider all 
the aspects easily 
Requires some ‘special talents’: power of 
observation, deductive thinking, etc. 
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Systematic, simple and quick (partly because it uses 
standardised causal factors) 
Does not cover every aspect (for instance 
organisational factors); focuses on human errors 
Good ability to determine what happened, how and why Little automation. Too ‘liberal’; dependent on 
investigator (subjective influence) 
Takes human factors into account Does not take organisational factors into account 
deeply enough 
Flexible Great dependence on interviews 
Allows the investigator flexibility Risk of forgetting to consider some aspects 
Flexibility Misses some facts on events 
HPIP Widely used, covers individuals’ contribution to the event 
development 
More examples needed 
MORT Comprehensive, systematic. Possibility of analysing 
several causal factors simultaneously 
Requires a lot of time and expertise 
AEB Free, focused on failures and errors Graph not always clear because potentially 
overlooks data and factors 
MTO Requires relatively low level of training Problem with parallel events 
 
Table 4.7. Strengths and weaknesses of RCA tools used 
 
RCA tools used Strengths Weaknesses 
ECFC combined 
with PSA 
Very good for complicated events Method is complicated and is not used for simple 
events 
Ability to connect different problems/causes and 
to be reduced to a simple level for use in short 
presentations  
No full software available, so still performed 
manually (with aid of MS Office programs) 
E&CFC 
 
Good visual aid when presenting, helps to drill 
down into underlying issues 
Not always used at the start of the investigation 
and used as a timeline rather than an analysis tool 
Good starting point, simple to use Must be combined with other tools Change analysis 
 Accurate tool Only for special cases 
Task analysis Accurate tool if procedure is used Only for special cases 
Best for human and organisational issues Dependent on interviewer skills  Interviewing 
Direct, first-hand information is obtained Must be carried out shortly after the event 
Cause and effect 
analysis 
Organises data and develops analysis Time consuming, needs practice 
Causal Factor 
Diagram 
Makes the event description and its causes easier 
to understand 
Not a very powerful investigation tool 
Human Performance 
Investigation Tool 
Helps to gain context relating to the situation. 
Helps to define corrective actions to combat 
certain behaviours 
Can sometimes focus on the last individual in the 
chain rather than on the organisational issues 
TapRooT Provides detailed procedures Risk of tunnel vision 
Pareto Good management tool Limited use (indicators, trending, etc.) 
 
5. General observations regarding existing practices in event investigations 
There is broad consensus about the objectives, goals and main principles of event investigations for 
different industries [21]. Members of an accident investigation team and all stakeholders involved in an 
investigation should feel responsibility toward it and follow specific rules on the conduct expected of them 
and the ethical principles that should govern their behaviour. A general framework for accident investigation 
based on broad consensus may include: 
• Strict adherence to the objective of carrying out the investigation in order to prevent accidents and 
incidents and enhance safety — not to apportion blame or liability. 
• The necessity and duty to investigate all major accidents and important near-accidents in order to 
learn lessons and take corrective actions. 
• Allocation of resources for the investigation in proportion to the scale and complexity of the incident 
and the scope for learning lessons. 
• Formulation and follow-up of recommendations with the aim of reducing the relevant risk factors 
involved. 
Some examples of the ethical principles that a code should include are [21]: 
• Integrity. At all times the activities carried out should be in accordance with the high standards of 
integrity required of the role played, profession pursued or position held by the individual. 
• Objectivity. When collecting, analysing, describing or communicating facts, the main emphasis 
should be on objectivity. 
• Logic. Facts should be applied in a logical manner. 
• Prevention. Facts and analysis should be used to develop findings and recommendations that will 
improve safety. 
• Independence. The investigative body, its investigators and staff should be independent of the 
national judicial system, other authorities and all other actors and parties involved. 
The investigative process consists of several interconnected phases and steps in the iterative processing of 
facts, findings and analysis [21]: 
 
 
Figure 5.1. General structure of the event investigation process 
 
The rationale in accident investigations consists of diagnosing unknown situations through an iterative 
reasoning cycle in which a temporary and conditional adaptation of the hypothesis under investigation takes 
place. One way of looking at the investigation is that it is about reducing uncertainty about what happened, 
why it happened and what should be done about it by applying the knowledge available to the investigator(s) 
based on the evidence obtained during the investigation. In that sense, management of the investigative 
process can best be described as: 
• Structuring known facts and findings; 
• Structuring unknown information that will require further collection or analysis. 
Finally, throughout the investigation, a cyclic decision-making process takes place, covering perception, 
analysis, decision-making and action. In particular, where information deficiencies occur due to lack of 
evidence or data, additional ways of collecting data must be explored. 
 
It is commonly recognised that the most important methodology for incident investigation and 
qualitative evaluation is root cause analysis. The RCA methodology is built on a basic principle — 
recognition that controlling causes translates into controlling the problem. The general logic of RCA 
follows the classical process: define the undesired outcome, define the analysis requirements, gather 
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data, analyse data, form conclusions, check conclusions, and recommend corrective action [2, 22, 23]. 
The theory behind root cause analysis is deceptively simple: event-based problems are solved by 
eliminating or mitigating at least one root cause. 
 
Despite its limitations and shortcomings [2], RCA serves well for identifying, analysing, eliminating or 
mitigating root causes and causal factors of an undesired outcome. It helps organisations to identify risk 
or weak points in processes, underlying or systemic causes and corrective actions. RCA enables people 
to understand, recognise and discuss the underlying beliefs and practices that result in poor 
quality/safety in an organisation (see Figure 5.2 [13]). Information from RCA shared between and 
among organisations can help to prevent future events. However, the effectiveness of an event 
investigation rests less on the root cause analysis methods, tools or techniques used than on the 
thoroughness of the investigation conducted. Investigation methods and tools are only as good as their 
users: tools are servants not masters. Used properly by adequately qualified and experienced 
investigators, any of them can be effective and produce good results. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The ‘root’ system of an event 
 
Analysis of existing practices in event investigations in the nuclear industry (including the survey 
findings) shows that there are several groups of obstacles hindering efforts to make the process of 
feedback of OE gained from event investigations more effective: 
 
1. Thresholds for initiating event investigation at specific level (troubleshooting, apparent cause 
investigation or root cause analysis) are not clearly defined. It is recommended [2, 10, 17, 24] 
that every organisation should establish their own threshold criteria or sentinel events for 
defining the level of analysis depending on the type of industry, the organisation and the 
potential risk involved in its activities. Following the idea of continuous improvement, the 
threshold criteria should be periodically reviewed and revised: if no problems are meeting the 
threshold criteria, they should be tightened; if time and resources spent on investigation exceed 
the acceptable limits, they should be relaxed. Such flexibility allows organisations to set 
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threshold criteria that are based on management decisions or engineering judgment about event 
consequences and are easily managed following business, corporate or even personal interests. 
 
2. There is no adequate system of commonly agreed terms, definitions and classification even for 
the most important concepts of event investigations and no standards for event investigation 
methods and tools. Definition of the basic concepts is of utmost importance, because ‘you will 
always find what you are looking for’. A typical example of the ambiguous treatment of such 
basic terms is the continuing controversy around the main object of the entire methodology — 
the meaning of the notion ‘root cause’. In the absence of an accepted system of terminology any 
investigator can call any cause of a problem a ‘root cause,’ and he/she will be correct. For the 
same reason, root cause analysis is anything that anybody wants it to be: any event-based 
problem-solving methodology could be called a root cause analysis, and that assertion would be 
correct. The view exists that the root cause is a myth [25], because seeking the ‘root cause’ is an 
endless exercise: no matter how deep you go there is always at least one more cause you can 
look for. Some specialists recommend even avoiding the word ‘cause’ in accident investigations 
and rather talk about what might have prevented the accident. Definitions of such frequently 
found root causes of events as ‘human factors’, ‘organisational factors’, ‘safety culture’, etc. also 
have different meanings for different people. 
 
3. The quality of many event investigations is relatively low. This seems to apply not only to the 
nuclear industry, but also to other high-risk industries and areas, including such specific areas as 
health and safety [23] and environmental protection [26]. A classic mistake in the use of RCA is 
to concentrate on the direct causes or symptoms of a problem instead of the actual root cause, 
basically because the investigators stop asking ‘Why?’ too early [2, 10, 22]. Many accident 
investigations do not go far and deep enough. They identify the technical cause of the accident, 
and then connect it to a variant of ‘operator error’ — the line worker who forgot to insert the 
bolt, the engineer who miscalculated the stress, or the junior line manager or supervisor who 
made the wrong decision. But this is rarely the whole issue. When determination of the causal 
chain is limited to the technical flaw and/or individual failure, typically the actions taken to 
prevent a similar event in the future are also limited: fix the technical problem, change the 
procedure, and replace or retrain the individual responsible. Putting these corrections in place 
leads to another mistake: the belief that the problem is solved. So, many accident investigations 
stay at the surface — thus leaving room for the same type of events to recur. Furthermore, 
weaknesses in investigation could block the ability to find both generic characteristics from the 
analysis of the event and other characteristics of interconnected events [2, 8, 21]. 
 
4. The importance of the principle of independence of the investigation is commonly acknowledged 
[17, 21] but this principle is rarely implemented in the bulk of organisations. Protecting the 
investigation team from any external or internal pressures, such as undue time pressures, 
pressures from the line organisation involved or peer pressure, etc., is one of the responsibilities 
of management [17], but this requirement seems to be theoretical — far removed from real 
practice. The findings of the survey [1] confirm this notion: independent external 
experts/consultants are rarely included in the event investigation teams. 
 
5. The existing system of information about OE from events is not comprehensive and user-
friendly. Much of the valuable information gained from event investigations is stored in the form 
of raw data: it is not adequately systematised, catalogued, classified and coded, so it is not 
converted into knowledge that is ready for use and learning. And a lot of event-related 
information is stored in databases with restricted access and cannot be used by researchers or 
even by regulators (the WANO database is a typical example). 
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6. The drawbacks in applying root cause analysis are the time necessary to conduct a proper 
investigation and the expense it entails, in part because all parties involved are taken away from 
the processes linked to the plant’s operation. In addition, performing root cause analysis can 
require training and retraining the personnel participating in the investigation at each incident, 
especially when the incidence rate is low and skills are lost due to infrequent opportunities to 
practice investigations. Consequently, root cause analysis systems are not usually well received 
by supervisory personnel, who are typically ‘too busy’ for the paperwork or unwilling to 
thoroughly study and execute a complicated RCA process [38]. 
 
The lack of commonly agreed definitions and concepts within the field of accident investigation 
(especially regarding the notion of cause) leads to confused thinking, unclear goals and inadequate 
results and makes it difficult to compare different methods, tools and techniques [2, 13, 15]. Knowledge 
gained from theoretical and practical results and experience accrued by event investigators, scientists 
and practitioners concerning the classification, comparison and selection of event investigation methods 
and tools has none of the features of a library for scientists or a tidily ordered toolkit for practitioners. 
Why? 
• Providers of commercial event investigation tools are not interested in their standardisation, 
through fear of losing their uniqueness in the market, with a potential negative impact on their 
business. 
• Scientists and researchers/developers of the methodologies, methods and tools are interested in 
establishing their self-importance/significance or self-image (a natural human trait) by inventing 
‘new’ instruments for analysis, more sophisticated specific definitions and barely understandable 
theories that differ only minimally from already existing ones, and in getting their work into 
print. 
 
The ongoing discussion around the term ‘root cause’ seems to be of the utmost importance and deserves 
more thorough attention, because it reflects at least two different philosophies governing event 
investigation practices, defining possible outcomes and influencing the effectiveness of the entire 
learning from operational experience process. The existing variety of definitions of root cause could be 
divided into two groups depending on the role of management which is assigned to the entire event 
investigation process from the outset [2]. 
1. First group: definitions stating that root causes are only those causes which could be reasonably 
identified and fixed by management: 
(a) Root causes are specific underlying causes which can reasonably be identified, controlled 
to fix by management and those for which effective recommendations for preventing 
recurrences can be generated [Rooney, 27]. 
(b) A root cause is the most basic cause (or causes) that can reasonably be identified and that 
management has control to fix and, when fixed, will prevent (or significantly reduce the 
likelihood of) the problem recurring [Paradies, 28]. 
(c) A root cause is the most basic cause that can be reasonably identified and that 
management has control to fix [Paradies, 29]. 
(d) A root cause is the most basic cause that can reasonably be identified and that 
management has control to fix and, when fixed, will prevent or significantly reduce the 
likelihood of the problem’s occurrence or existence [30]. 
2. Second group: definitions stating that root causes do not depend on management’s ability to fix 
them: 
(e) Root causes are the most fundamental reasons for an incident or condition, which if 
removed will minimise the risk of recurrence of the incident or condition [Conger, 31]. 
(f) A root cause is the fundamental cause of an initiating event, correction of which will 
prevent recurrence of the initiating event (i.e. the root cause is the failure to detect and 
correct the relevant latent weakness(es) and the reasons for that failure) [IAEA, 32]. 
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(g) Root cause: any cause in the cause continuum that is acted upon by a solution such that 
the problem does not recur [Gano, 10]. 
(h) A root cause is the absence of a best practice or a failure to apply knowledge that would 
have prevented the problem [Paradies, 33]. 
(i) Root cause (of an incident): an initiating event or failing from which all other causes or 
failings spring. Root causes are generally management, planning or organisational 
failings. [34] 
The main difference between the definitions of root causes assigned to these two groups is a distinct 
approach to the role of management. Definitions (a) to (d) are based on the assumption that only those 
causes which can be controlled and fixed by management can be recognised as root causes. Definition 
(a) describes ‘root cause’ even more narrowly: it states that only those causes for which effective 
recommendations for preventing recurrences can be generated can be recognised as root causes. 
Accordingly, definitions (a) to (d) promote a philosophy according to which a root cause is not a direct 
result of objective reality but a consequence of management’s ability (or inability) to control existing 
reality and fix emerging problems. Such an approach is very popular and widespread in the nuclear 
industry, especially among event investigators subordinate to management. It is strongly promoted by 
some providers of commercial root cause analysis tools and software. By way of an illustration, 
Herrmann [35] says that one of the pitfalls to be avoided in event investigation are weak reviewers — 
people overly concerned about looking bad in front of management, the regulator, etc. Such definitions 
of the root cause are methodologically incorrect for the purpose of event investigation, because they 
introduce essential limitations of the scope and potential outcome of an investigation: it looks as if root 
causes could be found only at the levels lying below management. However, it will be shown later that 
according to statistics and the opinions of numerous investigators root causes frequently lie precisely 
inside the management, and only better management could help to prevent (or significantly reduce the 
likelihood of) the problem recurring. 
 
Root cause definition examples (e) to (i) declare that there is no dependency between the root cause and 
management’s ability (or inability) to control it. Despite the abundance of definitions, no one of them is 
perfect. For example, definition (f) lacks clarity and concreteness, because other undefined terms are 
used for the purpose of explanation, and the requirement ‘to prevent recurrence of the initiating event’ 
seems completely unrealistic: some event probability will always exist. Definition (e) seems to be quite 
logical; however, it stresses that several root causes should be found, not one. But if so, all of these root 
causes should be removed to minimise the risk of recurrence of the incident or condition. However, 
observations have revealed that such a recommendation is not very realistic and practical because the 
availability of resources for numerous corrective actions to fix a lot of root causes is always limited in 
all organisations. Recognition of several root causes in definitions (a), (b), (e) and (g) means that the 
distinction between ‘root cause’ and simply ‘cause’ is lost. The need ‘to prevent recurrence of the event 
or problem’ appears to be a common shortcoming of definitions (g) and (h). The absence of best practice 
or the failure to apply existing knowledge — the basis for definition (h) — seems to be more likely a 
direct cause than a root cause, because a lot of information concerning event investigations is 
accumulated. The weakness of definition (i) is in its one-sidedness: a root cause could be not only the 
initiating event but also some action or condition. 
Taking the above considerations into account, it seems reasonable to use the following definition of root 
cause: 
The root cause is the most fundamental reason for an incident or adverse condition, which if removed 
will effectively prevent or minimise recurrence of the incident or condition. 
6. Bottlenecks in existing event investigation practices 
Considerable resources have been devoted to operational feedback systems and especially event 
investigation and analysis. A lot of operational experience is accrued in all the so-called high-risk 
industries, such as aviation, energy, chemicals, gas, oil, mining or transport. Considering the nuclear 
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industry only, 440 nuclear reactors producing electricity around the world have been in operation for 
approximately 14 000 cumulated reactor-years. In each operating unit from several hundreds to several 
thousands of events occur each year (taking into account all types of events, including accidents, serious 
events important for safety, incidents, near misses and low-level events). Thousands of records and 
reports about these occurrences are stored in IAEA/NEA, WANO, US NRC and a number of other 
regional and national databases. The volume of information on events and accidents, their causes, 
circumstances, consequences, corrective actions and lessons learned could be measured in terabytes and 
is steadily growing. However, despite these substantial efforts even major events still recur, and there 
are some indications that their frequency is increasing. 
 
Leaving aside peculiarities and specific conditions, with rare exceptions we can state that most events 
which are occurring today or will occur tomorrow are not new — similar events have happened 
somewhere before, and information about these events that could be helpful to prevent them recurring 
does exist somewhere. The same view is shared by many managers and experts [21]: the same types of 
events reoccur with the same type of causes. The general problem is that the system of feedback of 
information based on operational experience is not effective enough to prevent or even reduce the 
frequency of events recurring. 
 
So why do events nevertheless recur? Why can they not be prevented despite the unimaginable progress 
made by information technology in processing operational experience data and the billions spent on 
implementing corrective actions? Since these questions are clearly too general and too complex, their 
importance compels us to try to find some at least partial answers. 
 
If attempts to prevent an event recurring have proved unsuccessful, it could be analysed using classical 
root cause analysis methodology. Such an event was able to happen because some direct causes exist: 
• Information about previous events does not exist or is incorrect (events were not investigated or 
the investigation was too superficial; the real root causes of the event were not found, and no 
lessons to be learned were identified). 
• Correct information about previous events and lessons learned exists but is not accessible or 
could not be found easily by the relevant people. 
• No attempts were made to find existing information about previous events and lessons learned. 
• Measures based on the existing information about how to prevent recurrence of the event were 
inadequate or were not implemented adequately. 
 
Digging deeper and looking for causal factors and latent root causes of the event’s recurrence, at least 
three groups of closely related reasons could be identified that lie behind the direct causes listed above: 
1. Methodological factors (thresholds for specific levels of investigation not set; lack of standards 
for event investigation methods and tools; lack of a system of agreed terms and definitions; 
principle of independence of the investigation not fulfilled); 
2. So-called human or organisational factors (HOF) linked to the quality/safety culture and ethics of 
personnel at all levels, including management (conflict between business/carrier interests and 
safety goals; imperfect system of values; objective features of human nature; lack of motivation 
and/or insufficient resources provided, etc.). Events with a clear indication of HOF causes are 
still described as almost entirely caused by technical factors. Culture-related organisational 
factors are rarely considered in event and incident investigation. Here the role of the senior 
management is essential [36]: organisations and persons may be unwilling to be self-critical 
because of potential repercussions (internal/external). Even if recognised, HOF issues are 
typically understood as human performance errors at the individual worker level. 
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3. Knowledge management-related factors: typical when only raw OE information exists; data are 
not processed/structured/coded and not converted into knowledge, or information is not 
accessible due to restrictions. 
 
An event and causal factors chart aiming to explain possible scenarios leading to event recurrence, 
potential negative impacts and emerging traps in the event investigation process is presented in Figure 
5.3. The chart was created by summarising the results of the survey [1] and considering the existing 
experience of event investigations [2] as well as direct communication with experienced investigators 
working for the nuclear industry. The normal (theoretical) flow of the event investigation process is 
shown in green, and an alternative route leading to event recurrence is shown in pink. 
 
The first barrier in the way of event investigation (see Figure 5.3) is the event review/screening. This 
activity is usually performed by an authorised plant committee, board, commission or group with the 
active participation of management. The event investigation may be started automatically as required by 
some validated plant procedure if the preconditions are fulfilled; sometimes it is also initiated by the 
plant management or regulatory body. The level of investigation necessary is determined during the 
review/screening depending on the level of the event, subject to a set of criteria taken from the 
organisation’s technical specifications and supporting procedures [17]. Since thresholds for initiating an 
event investigation at a specific level (troubleshooting, apparent cause investigation or root cause 
analysis) are not standardised and seldom even clearly defined, a degree of freedom exists to choose a 
low level of investigation even for events that are important for safety or involve valuable OE 
information. Such decisions (e.g. not to perform a root cause analysis) could be based on opinions of 
screening board members, engineering judgment or management discretion [16, 17]. In practice, a 
nuclear plant may actually perform three to five or maybe even ten good root cause analyses per year (a 
trend can be observed towards performing fewer and fewer RCAs per year — 2-3 RCAs per unit per 
year on average) [36]. But NPPs carry out hundreds or even thousands of short-cut (apparent cause) 
analyses instead, claiming at the same time that the rate of root cause analysis is growing and that key 
performance indicators are therefore improving. The thousands of corrective actions based on guesses 
and assumptions derived from inefficient shallow investigations are driving the improvements in those 
indicators. So time and resources are wasted on short-cut investigations and best-guess corrective 
actions, and many nuclear managers complain that improvement programmes are not cost-effective. 
 
The second potential barrier in the way of successful event investigation (see Figure 5.3) lies in its 
preparation. Making the relevant preparations for an investigation is the direct responsibility of 
management [17]: they should establish and implement an event investigation process within the 
management system, provide appropriate resources, select the lead investigator, ensure that the 
investigation team is staffed with adequately trained personnel, draft in external experts if required and 
protect it from undue time pressures. Failure to fulfil these requirements leads to the appointment of a 
weak investigation team and/or the creation of unfavourable conditions for investigations. For example, 
the investigation team should not be pressured to produce results prematurely either by internal 
deadlines or external influences (regulator). This could result in superficial analysis in order to come up 
with easy-to-accomplish corrective actions. The more serious the issues identified, the longer it takes to 
fix them (especially if organisational changes are needed). 
 
The third potential barrier hampering achievement of the highest quality and the best outcome from 
event investigations is in execution of the investigation itself. Here there are numerous traps of a 
methodological or organisational nature or to do with human factors and the safety/quality culture which 
were analysed above in chapter 5 and in [2]. Sometimes they are aggravated by insufficient support from 
management, and specifically limited access to information to conduct the investigation, lack of 
protection of the investigation team from external or internal pressures such as pressures from the line 
organisation involved or peer pressure, inadequate communication in support of the investigation team, 
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and a punitive culture. Practice demonstrates the existence of these circumstances, although their 
elimination is the direct responsibility of management. Potential also exists to influence the investigation 
in a particular direction or to restrict it to identifying individual failures of shop-floor workers or junior 
engineering personnel. This is especially evident when underlying causes for the incidents are ultimately 
supervisory and/or managerial. Most situations which arise within an organisational context can be 
resolved through a variety of approaches. These different approaches generally require different levels 
of resource expenditure to implement. And, due to the immediacy which exists in most organisational 
situations, there is a tendency to opt for the solution which is the most expedient in terms of dealing with 
the situation. In doing this the tendency is generally to treat the symptom rather than the underlying 
fundamental problem that is actually responsible for the situation occurring. Yet, in taking the most 
expeditious approach and dealing with the symptom, rather than the cause, what is generally ensured is 
that the situation will, in time, return and need to be dealt with again. 
 
The next obstacle sometimes hindering proper identification of the event’s root cause is the prevailing 
practice of harmonising the investigation results with management. This activity should theoretically be 
limited to verifying the accuracy of the draft report without influencing the course of the investigation 
[17]. However, in practice it frequently leads to adjustment of the outcome of the investigation: more 
serious or ‘unfavourable’ findings or identified causes that are uncomfortable for the plant management 
may be refused as ‘unacceptable’. This practice is supported by the complexity of the systems involved, 
the specificity of the causal nature resulting in the fact that validation of root causes relies on expert 
judgments and cannot be tested or confirmed in the same manner as the direct causes (i.e. via simulation, 
tests, etc.). In addition, senior managers are not typically provided with training in RCA techniques or 
HOF and may therefore be reluctant to accept report conclusions if HOF issues are identified. 
 
The last serious barrier in the way of successful event investigation (see Figure 5.3) lies in the stage of 
generating, approving and implementing corrective actions. It is imperative that corrective actions 
should be proposed by the investigation team to address the causes of the event and other areas for 
improvement. This activity is also strongly influenced when suggested corrective actions are harmonised 
with management. Completion of a magnificent RCA and proper identification of root causes does not 
mean that the problem at hand goes away. The investigation team might make recommendations that do 
not work or might make good recommendations that are not approved by management. Good 
recommendations might be approved but might not be implemented [37]. 
 
Knowledge management-related causal factors and latent root causes of event recurrence play a 
considerable role too. Since the volume of information relating to events and accidents is vast and is 
permanently growing, only a small part can be used in practice. The primary reason for this situation is 
that existing raw information is not converted into knowledge due to lack of resources or motivation: it 
is not properly prepared, screened, classified, catalogued, and formatted in a user-friendly form. So the 
relevant data are difficult to find, retrieve and use. Another important factor impeding the use of event-
related information is the restricted access to numerous databases. 
 
Consequently, the general objective of an event investigation — to prevent or at least minimise the risk 
of recurrence of the event — could be achieved if all the abovementioned barriers are overcome 
successfully. If the investigation process fails because of at least one of these barriers, the root causes of 
the event will not be properly identified, and corrective actions will be ineffective — they will not 
prevent the recurrence. 
 
Here it is worth stressing the essential role of management, which not only has direct responsibility, but 
also directly controls and influences all stages of an event investigation process (see Figure 5.3). 
However, the impact of management does not always lead to improvement of the quality of root cause 
analysis. Often, when a fault-oriented, punitive management style predominates, ‘fault’ and ‘cause’ are 
confused, and incident investigations typically seek to assign fault — and protect supervisors or higher 
organisational level personnel — by generating reports that document alleged responsibility. 
 
 
Screening 
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unclear 
 RCA results 
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Quality of 
investigation 
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Investigation 
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Figure 5.3. Possible routes of the event investigation process with potential negative impacts 
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The next question which logically should be asked is: why does management sometimes try to divert the 
event investigation process from identifying the real root causes of an event or avoid implementing the 
essential corrective actions to prevent recurrence? Why are such cases becoming more frequent despite 
management’s universally declared commitment to safety as the overriding priority? 
 
The answer to this question could be found by analysing the factors influencing the safety culture of an 
organisation, which in fact is developed, controlled and driven by the safety culture of the top 
management. According to W. Edwards Deming, most problems are management controllable — 
embedded in the manner in which management decides to operate the organisation [18, 39, 40, 41]. 
Corporate top managers influence safety not only through their decision-making on budgets and 
policies, but also through their daily actions and attitudes (see [2], Fig. 2.4.6). These channels of 
influence are important in forming the safety culture of the company, and the primary role of leaders in 
developing the organisational safety culture is essential. In nuclear and other high-risk industries safety 
culture is closely related to the handling of risk. However, the top management’s commitment to safety 
is often affected by the conflict between safety and production such that safety improvements based on 
event investigation results and OE lose priority in favour of business interests. 
 
An unfavourable environment for event investigation and the OE process could result from the 
following drawbacks in top management beliefs and behaviour [41, 42]: 
 
1. Putting short-term production cost-cutting objectives ahead of long-term safety goals. Key 
decisions are made by management based on accounting principles that do not recognise the 
concept of the cost of (poor) quality/safety. This is the most widely observed trend caused by 
growing economic pressure to reduce operating costs. In many countries nuclear facilities are 
constantly challenged to reduce operating costs due to the competition induced by deregulation 
of private facilities or decreased funding for government-owned facilities. This changing 
operating environment can lead to some services such as root cause analysis being considered as 
‘unnecessary’ expenses (especially by those who typically review the budget without 
understanding what RCA is), following which resources are cut or staff not directly engaged in 
operations are reduced. The remaining staff have to do more and are likely to have less 
opportunity to undergo the training needed to keep the appropriate qualifications up to date. 
 
2. Placing schedule considerations ahead of safety — a practice closely linked to the previous issue 
and also widespread in different industries including the nuclear sector. Hurrying to meet 
deadlines at any price leads to insufficient time being allowed to investigate an event, hasty 
conclusions and ineffective corrective actions. 
 
3. Maintaining an environment that is unfavourable to a questioning attitude. In some organisations 
fear is not driven out: it is not possible to discuss openly problems that may exist — mentioning 
a problem can be a career-limiting move. People who have the courage to talk about problems 
are then labelled as whistle-blowers and are often punished in both overt and subtle ways. 
Sometimes this is because acknowledging the problem will reveal that past efforts to fix it have 
been unsuccessful. 
 
4. Arrogance and overconfidence. Any organisational culture that creates an environment in which 
the captain, chief surgeon, scientist, pilot, top manager or president cannot be viewed as capable 
of making a mistake and cannot be questioned has embraced an arrogance that will ultimately 
lead to negative results or even disasters. Some organisations use such arguments to justify their 
decisions and actions: ‘Our organisation is made up of the best minds in our field. We’ve 
graduated from the top universities. We are highly experienced nuclear engineers. We are the 
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largest company in this field. We’ve been successful in this business for over 100 years. We have 
top level safety/security certificates. We invented this technology. We hold more patents than any 
other company. We have the top scholars in the field. We ride in private jets. We have private 
boxes at big sporting events’ [2-104]. Such an approach frequently leads to significant quality, 
environmental, health and safety problems. 
 
5. Underestimating the importance of fundamental knowledge, research and/or education. In some 
cases, people embark on new projects without fully understanding what the outcomes will be, 
which is fine if the lack of understanding is taken into account. 
 
6. Pervasively believing in entitlement. The entitlement belief system is one in which employees 
believe they are entitled to their jobs and their benefits due to years of service, past sacrifices and 
past performance. They believe they should be immune to the vagaries of market forces, the 
impact of new technologies and changes in customer requirements. When the belief in 
entitlement is pervasive, employees believe no one else would want to have their job and put up 
with all they have to put up with. They expect rises every year, regardless of the organisation’s 
performance. Entitlement is created by management’s failure to continually share business and 
performance information with the workforce. 
 
7. Autocratic leadership, resulting in ‘endullment’ of personnel. Endullment is the opposite of 
empowerment: when employees have no sense of control over or involvement in what they must 
do, they turn off, passively resist, become apathetic, fail to complete assignments. The same 
process occurs when management adopts an autocratic approach to decision making and does not 
share information with the workforce, does not provide a balanced scorecard or performance 
indicators and does not engage the members of the workforce in a collaborative effort to 
continuously improve their performance in order to secure their mutual economic well-being. 
 
Leaders who succumb to any of these seven fundamental temptations will not want to acknowledge their 
problems. They will ignore these concepts as unrealistic fiction and revert to their focus on costs, 
schedule, political manipulation, arrogance, ignorance, entitlement or endullment, resulting in 
weaknesses in safety culture, ineffective corrective actions and recurrence of events. 
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7. Recommendations 
7.1. Methodological recommendations 
 
In order to avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings currently surrounding the terms and definitions 
used in event investigation in general, and root cause analysis in particular, the following improved 
definitions are proposed. 
 
The root cause is the most fundamental reason for an event, which if removed will minimise the 
risk of the event’s recurrence. 
Root causes do not need to be under the organisation’s or management’s control (initiators and factors 
may exist outside the organisation), but the responsibility for effective barriers lies with the organisation. 
Root causes rarely appear alone, especially for complex systems. 
 
Root cause analysis (RCA) is an event investigation methodology consisting of a set of working 
methods, establishing an inquiry strategy and describing an integrated system of event investigation 
activities. RCA is designed to gain an understanding of the real or potential occurrence, its precursors, 
circumstances, conditions, direct and root causes, organising the facts and data obtained in order to 
arrive at a logical set of findings and conclusions, and making it possible to derive effective corrective 
actions and/or countermeasures to prevent or reduce the probability of future recurrences. 
 
Root cause analysis should be distinguished from simplified event investigation techniques such as 
apparent cause analysis and troubleshooting. 
 
Apparent cause analysis is based on a limited investigation that tries to quickly and simply determine 
the most immediate, or apparent, cause of a less significant event or sub-standard condition without 
recourse to full root cause analysis. 
 
Troubleshooting is a logical, systematic, experience-based process to identify failures, malfunction(s) 
or their symptoms within a technical system, to determine and eliminate their direct causes. 
 
The root cause analysis (RCA) method is a set of general procedures and rules establishing the tactics 
of an inquiry and providing discipline and guidance for the user to follow RCA methodology in a 
particular way. Each RCA method may involve many steps and processes and has wide usage; it is 
implemented using one or more (sometimes a combination of several) RCA tools and techniques and 
usually has its own taxonomy. 
 
A root cause analysis tool is a relatively simple event investigation instrument, developed through 
experience to assist investigators in identifying the root causes, providing detailed step-by-step working 
procedures for event analysis that can be recorded, repeated and verified. It is merely one of the vehicles 
for implementing and expressing the particular RCA method; it should be distinguished by its limited 
use, relatively narrow scope and concretely defined inputs, procedures and outputs. 
 
A root cause analysis technique is a specific practical manner of application of a root cause analysis 
tool requiring some skill, experience and knowledge. 
 
With a view to better distinguishing between event investigation instruments of different levels and 
applicability, the following system of classification of basic RCA methods and tools is suggested (see 
Figs 7.1 and 7.2). This system should make it easier to compare their characteristics and select the most 
appropriate instruments for event investigation. The suggested classification is not comprehensive: many 
more different methods and tools are used in different industries for event investigation, and new ones 
are being constantly developed. However, the suggested system could be treated as a template which 
could be adopted and expanded if required. Some of the universal tools presented in Figure 7.2 could be 
used not only for root cause analysis, but also for other event investigation methodologies, e.g. 
probabilistic safety analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Some of the most popular and commonly used root cause analysis methods 
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Figure 7.2. Some of the most popular and commonly used event investigation tools 
 
7.2. Recommendations for selecting RCA methods and tools 
 
The results of the survey (see chapter 4) show that the problem of selecting the most effective and 
appropriate method and tool for event investigation is not very topical for experienced practitioners in 
the nuclear industry and/or regulatory institutions. The problem emerges in new organisations entering 
the nuclear industry or expanding their nuclear programmes, which are establishing and developing new 
operational experience feedback systems based on event investigation results. 
Following the principle of separating event investigation instruments of different levels and the 
suggested classification system for RCA methods and tools (see Figs 7.1 and 7.2), the first step is to 
select the RCA method. Here it should be kept in mind that most of the internationally recognised root 
cause analysis methods, when used properly, will enable the investigation team to identify the root 
cause(s) of an event or adverse condition, if the investigation is adequately prepared, the investigation is 
independent, and both personnel and management have an appropriate safety culture. The following 
factors should be given preliminary consideration when selecting an RCA method: 
1. Results of benchmarking within and outside the nuclear industry with regard to value, 
comprehensiveness, operational reliability and efficiency; 
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2. Recommendations by international organisations and experienced colleagues; 
3. Amount of training needed to successfully use the method; 
4. Availability of software to support the method; 
5. Costs. 
Priority should be given to the first two characteristics: it should be ensured that factors such as cost, 
availability of software, training needs, time and ease will not take precedence over the important 
characteristics of value, comprehensiveness of analysis, operational reliability and efficiency. 
The more comprehensive process of selecting the appropriate RCA method for the needs of an 
organisation should consist of several sub-steps and meet the following criteria [16]: 
1. Determine your internal RCA needs. 
• Are you looking to set up an entire RCA-based event investigation system or to investigate a 
single incident only? 
• Will your RCA effort focus on ‘incidents’ only, chronic failures only, or both? 
• Will management support be solicited? 
• Will management systems be implemented? 
• Will teams be dedicated to carrying out RCAs? 
• Will hourly personnel and external experts participate in investigation teams? 
• Will additional technical resources be required? 
• Will additional technical equipment be required? 
2. Determine the appropriate RCA method to use for your environment 
• Evaluate simplicity of method. 
• Evaluate analysis flexibility. 
• Evaluate quality of materials and job aids. 
• Evaluate training flexibility. 
• Evaluate method comprehensiveness. 
• Evaluate system to track for results. 
• Evaluate overall value of method (cost-benefit analysis). 
3. Determine how to implement it: in-house or outsource 
• Does the facility possess the instructional technology skills and resources to develop in-house 
courses on the evaluated and proven RCA method? 
• Is it more economical and timely to develop courses in-house (cost-benefit)? 
• Would utilising past vendor training be appropriate for in-house instructors? 
• Is there any copyright infringement concern in utilising past vendor training in-house? 
• Are qualified RCA instructors with field experience available in-house? 
• Would in-house instructors be dedicated to supporting and mentoring their students? 
• Would management be willing to fund the RCA method development in-house? 
• Would management be willing to wait for completion of the skill development and then 
implementation? 
4. Choose the appropriate RCA vendor 
• Does the vendor provide the RCA method chosen by the facility? 
• Does the vendor have training in RCA for field personnel, engineers and management? 
• Does the vendor possess various methods that complement each other and provide 
specifically designed training to the appropriate level of audience? 
• Does the vendor’s instructor(s) have field experience in implementing RCA? How much? 
• Does the vendor’s instructor(s) have experience in instructional technology and applied 
learning to increase presentation retention rates? 
• Can the vendor provide references of successful client field applications, including nuclear 
industry applications? 
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• Does the vendor have products/services to support the RCA method (management system 
support models, software, on-site facilitation services, follow-up capabilities, etc.)? 
• Is the vendor willing to customise instruction and materials to accommodate your needs? 
• Is the vendor willing to work on specific, ongoing in-house failures during training? 
• Does the vendor possess the staff-related skills to deal with managerial culture 
transformations? 
• Is the vendor willing to partner? Share risk? 
• Does the vendor possess the staff capacity to handle your requirements? Domestically? 
Internationally? 
 
Obviously, this list of criteria is not as comprehensive as it possibly could be; however, it is a good 
starting point. The key to starting is clearly defining what is wanted and obtaining internal support for 
the vision. Then the task will be to solicit the qualified vendors to help realise the vision. 
 
After the appropriate RCA method is chosen, the next step is to select root cause investigation tools and 
techniques. The need and freedom to select the appropriate RCA tools are limited (sometimes very 
strictly) by the following conditions: 
• Suitable RCA tools could be already defined during the selection of a particular RCA method. 
• Chosen RCA tools should be applicable to the type of event that has occurred and is to be 
investigated. 
• Some RCA tools serve specific purposes only (for example, collecting information and evidence, 
presenting the event sequence graphically, etc.) and cannot be replaced by other tools (see Fig. 
7.2). 
• Some RCA tools (especially basic and universal ones — see Fig. 7.2) are employed in practically 
all event investigations. 
In any event, during selection of the appropriate RCA tools it is recommended that reference be made to 
Table 7.1, which compares the features of some of the most frequently used RCA tools. 
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Table 7.1. Comparison of features of some root cause analysis tools and techniques 
 
RC tool 
Type of 
event 
Amount 
of 
informati
on needed 
Single E/ 
repeated E/ 
trend 
Safety 
significanc
e 
Time needed to 
implement 
 
Resources and 
training needs Advantages Disadvantages 
Interviewing All Low Single E 
Repeated E 
Any Quick Trained and 
experienced 
interviewer  
Information gathering technique for 
investigations 
Information gathering technique for 
investigations 
Task analysis All Low/task- 
specific 
Parts of any 
event 
Can be used 
for any 
Time needed to 
complete process is 
moderate; however, 
individual causal 
factors can be 
identified quickly 
Minimal training 
required 
Someone familiar with 
the type of task being 
evaluated 
Easily identifies differences between the 
proper performance of a task and the 
performance of the task at the time it 
was carried out when it was related to 
the event being investigated 
Very helpful to identify causal factors 
that relate to physical environment and 
man-machine interface 
Usually requires the availability of an 
individual technically knowledgeable about 
the task being evaluated 
May not be effective when task cannot be re-
enacted 
Used specifically for single tasks, cannot be 
used for complex evolutions by itself 
Technique cannot be used on its own to 
identify root causes 
Change 
analysis 
All Low to 
medium 
Single E Recommended 
for low/ 
medium 
Medium Minimal training 
required 
 
Best technique for identifying causes of 
issues when something changes between 
a successful development and one that 
has contributed to an event or issue 
Can be used for any type of change from
a standard approach 
 
If used in isolation, can result in only the 
obvious changes being identified 
Must be used together with task analysis 
when change being evaluated is composed of 
more than one task 
Cannot be used for first-time developments 
Can overlook gradual changes or evaluator 
can accept the wrong (obvious) answer. 
Technique cannot be used alone to identify 
root causes 
 42 
Barrier 
analysis 
All Medium Single E 
Repeat E 
Any Short Minimal training 
required 
Someone technically 
familiar with the 
process or development 
being investigated 
Can identify probable causal factors 
with a systematic approach   
Used in conjunction with E&CF, can 
identify process weaknesses and the 
effectiveness of proposed CAs 
If the evaluator is not familiar with the 
technical aspects of the event being 
investigated, they may not recognise all 
barriers   
Technique cannot be used alone to identify 
root causes  
Event and 
causal factor 
chart 
All High/entire 
event 
Single E 
Repeated E 
All 
significance 
levels 
Time needed to 
complete process is 
long; however, 
individual causal 
factors can be 
identified quickly 
Trained/experienced 
E&CF evaluator 
Provides an illustration of the whole 
problem from initiating event through to 
recovery actions. 
 
Time-consuming 
Evaluator needs experience for proficiency 
Technique is not useful for evaluating trends 
unless they are the result of a sequence of 
issues over a period of time  
Cause and 
effect analysis 
Non-complex 
events 
Low, but 
causal factors 
must be 
identified 
before this 
technique is 
used 
Single E Recommended 
for low to 
medium 
Quick Minimal training 
required 
Someone familiar with 
the process 
Provides an easy approach for 
identifying root causes, for non-complex 
events 
 
Begins after causal factors are identified, 
therefore when viewed by itself it will not 
provide all background information to 
understand a complex problem   
Requires experience to ask the right questions
Fault tree 
analysis 
 
Equipment High Single E 
Repeated E 
High Long Minimal training 
required; however, 
technical knowledge of 
the issue being 
investigated is 
important 
Allows a graphic depiction of how cause 
and effect are related to the event being 
investigated 
Can be used to evaluate complex events 
with multiple outcomes 
Good method for evaluating equipment 
failures 
Subjective in that all possible causes must be 
identified in order for this tool to work 
properly 
Designed for identifying direct causes rather 
than causal factors 
Technique cannot be used alone to identify 
root causes  
Event tree 
analysis 
Equipment High Single E 
Repeated E 
High Long Minimal training 
required 
A specialist in PRA is 
needed 
Technical knowledge 
of the issue being 
investigated is 
important 
Specialised software  
Each outcome is weighted allowing for 
the prioritisation of corrective actions 
based on impact on the event or issue 
being evaluated 
Labour-intensive 
Needs to be used with other techniques to 
populate the event tree 
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Why-why 
(why 
staircase) 
All Low All All Once causal factors are 
identified (depending 
on other techniques 
used), process can be 
completed quickly 
Not many resources or 
training needed   
Most effective when 
performed by 
individual with a 
leadership perspective 
on the organisation 
Can be used for all types of events to 
identify programmatic and 
organisational weaknesses 
Simple technique, used to challenge the 
causes identified by other techniques 
Highly subjective 
Difficult to know when to stop asking ‘why’ 
(experience needed) 
Does not easily differentiate between root 
causes and contributing causes 
Needs to be used by an investigator familiar 
with the specific programmes and 
organisation 
Needs to be used with other techniques to 
identify the causal factors 
Common 
cause analysis 
All High Trend Can be used 
for all levels 
High Training should 
include using trend 
reports, understanding 
causal factors and how 
they are assigned 
Can be used to identify programmatic or 
organisational weaknesses when trends 
in causal factors appear 
Can be used with any data sets that 
causal factors can be assigned to 
Quality of the analysis depends on the 
number and accuracy of the data points 
A successful CCA will only result in the 
identification of the more dominant common 
causes for a group of events; a root cause 
method must be used in order to identify root 
causes and contributing causes of the trends 
identified 
Current 
reality tree 
Organisationa
l or 
programmatic 
High Single E 
Repeated E 
Medium/high Process takes a long 
time to complete; 
however, time needed 
to identify individual 
causal factors can be 
moderate 
Process expert in the 
use of this 
methodology 
Individual with 
technical knowledge of 
organisation 
Allows common groupings to be found 
and organises them for many different 
issues 
Good for identifying organisational 
factors 
CRT could be found too difficult or time- 
consuming 
Needs to be used with other techniques to 
identify the causal factors  
Failure 
modes and 
effects 
analysis 
Equipment 
issues 
High Single E 
Repeated E 
High Long High level of technical 
expertise related to the 
failure 
Trained facilitator is 
needed 
Provides a disciplined approach to 
evaluating possible causes of equipment 
failures. 
Good method to confirm the cause and 
support the determination of the most 
effective CAs 
Time-consuming   
Expertise is needed to effectively evaluate 
possible causes. The team may not recognise 
all potential causes   
Needs to be used with other techniques to 
identify the causal factors 
Human factor
investigation 
tool 
 Human 
performance 
Medium/high Single E High Long 
 
Need for a human 
factor specialist  
HFIT is useful for developing corrective 
actions related to human performance 
improvement 
Resource-intensive 
The tool relies heavily on the expertise of the 
specialist in order to get an accurate outcome
Physiological 
and 
psychological 
investigation 
Human 
performance 
Medium Single E 
Repeated E 
High Medium Trained medical staff 
and human factor 
specialist 
Allows proactive identification and 
correction of a human performance 
failure mode 
Some individuals may consider this tool to be 
an excessive intrusion of their privacy  
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Ergonomics 
analysis 
Human 
performance 
Low Single E Low/medium Moderate; however, 
individual causal 
factors can be quickly 
identified 
Human factor/ 
technical expertise 
The tool highlights the following 
aspects: 
- shortcomings of man-machine 
interfaces 
- inappropriate workload 
- incompatibility with infrequently 
performed changes 
- incompatibility with usability of 
documentation  
The tool relies heavily on the expertise of the 
specialist in order to get an accurate outcome
 
 
Kepner-
Tregoe 
problem 
analysis 
Equipment 
issues 
Medium/high Single E 
Repeated E 
High Process takes a long 
time to complete; 
however, time needed 
to identify individual 
causal factors can be 
moderate 
Training, experience, 
licence, technical 
expertise, team needed
A rational, industry-proven process that 
allows a focused approach to solving 
discrete problems. The system approach 
prevents any aspect of the issue being 
overlooked 
Proprietary technique, expensive licence 
required, complicated, extensive training in 
the technique is required and constant 
practice in its use is necessary 
Significant amount of time, energy and 
resources may be required for verifying the 
true causes of the event 
Interrelations
hip diagram 
Complex High Single E High Long Team needed A structured approach that enables 
complex relationships to be analysed 
using a non-linear approach 
Subjective and complex 
Needs to be used with a method to validate 
the accuracy of the root causes identified 
JNES 
Organisa-
tional Factors 
List (JOFL) 
Human and 
organisation 
issues 
Low Single E 
Repeated E 
Recommended 
for high; can 
be used for 
any 
Individual causal 
factors can be 
identified quickly 
Someone with a little 
training can carry out 
the analysis using a 
‘JOFL classification’ 
Questionnaires 
Provides an illustration of the whole 
problem and contributing factors. Works 
very well with barrier analysis 
Identifying problems in the timeline is 
outside its scope (aim of the method is to 
assess the effectiveness of a root cause 
analysis) 
Analysts may need to make changes to match 
the organisation which is the subject of the 
evaluation 
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7.3. Recommendations for conducting RCA 
 
The effectiveness of learning from the operating experience feedback process could be increased if root 
causes of events are properly identified and corrected, allowing lessons to be learned and shared with 
others in the industry. High-quality event investigation in general, and root cause analysis in particular, 
could therefore make a substantial positive contribution to improvements in nuclear safety. 
In general, successful root cause analysis of an event depends on: 
• Appropriate existing infrastructure to support the investigation; 
• Adequate preparation for the investigation; 
• Whether or not potential barriers and bottlenecks hampering the investigation are removed; 
• The safety/quality culture of personnel, and of senior management especially. 
Taking into account a great deal of existing advice, recommendations, tips and guides [2] and trying to 
avoid repeating them, the following specific suggestions can be made for conducting RCA more 
effectively. 
1. The level of investigation necessary (troubleshooting, apparent cause investigation or root cause 
analysis) should be determined correctly during the event review/screening. Decisions should be 
properly substantiated and based on a set of objective criteria evaluated against clearly defined 
thresholds. Attempts, based on personal opinions, to simplify and speed up the investigation of 
safety-relevant events by avoiding a detailed root cause analysis process should be resisted. 
2. Root cause analyses undertaken on ‘near hits, near misses and close calls’ can be just as 
productive as or even more effective than those done on major incidents. Typically, root causes 
for ‘near hits, near misses and close calls’ are the same as those for major incidents. Only the 
consequences or outcomes differ, and they are the result of luck. 
3. Preparing properly for root cause investigation is an important prerequisite for success. 
Preparatory steps such as establishing and implementing an effective event investigation process 
within the management system, providing appropriate resources, selecting the relevant lead 
investigator, staffing the investigation team with experienced and adequately trained personnel, 
drafting in external experts if required, creating favourable conditions for the investigation and 
protecting it from undue time pressures are necessary to achieve good results. 
4. Identifying and describing root causes for most events requires additional competencies from the 
human and social sciences. These types of competencies are traditionally very rare in a world of 
technicians and engineers and even amongst managers. Including human performance 
engineering specialists, psychologists and/or sociologists in the event investigation team should 
be considered. 
5. A typical mistake in conducting RCA should be avoided — namely concentrating on the direct 
causes or symptoms of a problem instead of the actual root cause, basically because the team 
stops asking ‘WHY?’ too early. The investigation should not be limited to the technical flaw 
and/or individual failure such as ‘operator error’. It should go far and deep enough and cover all 
organisational levels, including senior management. 
6. The benefits offered by RCA methods and tools using cause categorisation trees, ready-for-use 
universal checklists, computer software based on them and so-called ‘expert systems’ suggesting 
solutions for a given root cause should not be overestimated. Categorisation schemes restrict 
thinking by causing the investigator to stop at the categorical cause. Checklists give people the 
false sense that the correct answer must be among the listed items. Cause categorisation trees and 
computer software based on them create the illusion of finding the best solutions. These 
shortcomings and the disadvantages revealed by operational experience practices should also be 
taken into account during event investigation and offset by thorough evidence-based analysis of 
all causes and their inter-relationships. 
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7. All root causes of an event investigated should be identified the first time wherever possible; it is 
cheaper, less painful, and more efficient than discovering only one root cause per problem. 
8. The degree of independence of the investigation should be increased as much as possible, at least 
by including independent experts in the investigation team. The final outcome of an investigation 
depends on the stakeholders’ confidence in it, which to a certain extent is linked to the 
objectivity, integrity and competence of the investigative body. The appointment of members of 
the investigation team has to find the right trade-off between expertise (i.e. experts who know the 
field and its culture, technical advances and latest modifications, but are liable to lack 
impartiality) and independence (members who have no link with the field, but are liable to lack 
expertise). Investigators (lead and team) require the assurance that taking part in an investigation 
will not harm their careers in any way. 
9. Corrective actions and improvements should be based on reliable root cause analysis results, not 
on guesses and assumptions derived from ineffective shallow investigations like apparent cause 
analysis or troubleshooting. This could help avoid wasting time and resources on short-cut 
investigations and best-guess corrective actions, and improvement programmes will become 
more cost-effective. 
10. Management’s approach to and support for event investigation is essential. Management should 
encourage identification of the real root causes of an event and not limit the investigation to 
lower-ranking personnel or influence the investigation in a particular direction (especially when 
underlying causes of incidents are ultimately supervisory and/or managerial and their 
identification could be uncomfortable). 
8. Conclusions 
1. The appropriateness of the existing training system and the future training needs of event 
investigation team members remain topical issues and should be considered in future. Since most 
investigation teams are staffed with formally trained personnel, the prevailing form of training 
for most survey respondents is participation in short workshops. 
2. Event investigation teams are typically composed of technical specialists from the departments 
concerned in the plant, professional event investigators and representatives of management. The 
serious shortcoming of current practice in recruiting event investigation teams is that 
psychologists, human factor specialists and external experts/consultants are rarely included in the 
team. 
3. The event investigation process itself has a positive influence on safety for personnel interviewed 
or otherwise involved. Besides the final report and recommendations, involvement in the event 
investigation process seems to be useful in enhancing insight into and attitudes towards safety, 
increasing awareness and improving competencies, and discovering unknown dependencies 
between different functions or departments. 
4. During the last ten years event investigation practices have not changed much as regards the use 
of particular methods and tools. The most frequently used RCA methods at European nuclear 
plants remain HPES, MORT, ASSET and MTO. The choice of RCA tools is heavily restricted 
by their purpose and the needs of the method used; however, the most ‘popular’ ones are basic 
RCA tools (ECFC, barrier analysis, change analysis, task analysis and interviewing), which are 
used in practically all investigations. 
5. In most organisations the same event investigation instruments have been implemented and used 
for a long time (more than 10 years). Usually RCA methods and tools are obtained for free and 
there are no obvious trends towards replacing them with new ones. 
6. Results of the survey show that to further improve existing practices in event investigation it 
would be desirable to: 
• develop comprehensive software for further computerising the event investigation process, 
including RCA methods such as HPES and MORT; 
• resume IAEA technical support for the ASSET method; 
 47
• improve the education of event investigators by organising appropriate training, drafting 
simpler manuals and guidelines, and providing more practical examples; 
• organise more intensive exchange of experience among event investigators. 
7. The need for an independent investigation, free from any interference by vested interests (such as 
line management, supervisory authorities, certification bodies or commercial partners), has 
increasingly been recognised on account of its contribution to the overall quality of the 
investigation. However, the principle of the independence of event investigations is not in 
practice considered as an important and necessary feature. 
8. Existing practices demonstrate that event investigations frequently continue to remain focused on 
analysing the direct and immediate causes of events instead of attempting to dig deeper to 
identify latent root causes, such as human, organisational and management-related factors. 
Although the importance of correctly identifying these HOF-related causes is commonly 
understood, there is still a tendency for the analysis to focus solely on the technical issues of the 
event. 
9. The effectiveness of the event investigation and operational experience feedback process mostly 
depends on the safety culture of an organisation’s personnel, and of its senior management 
especially. Management should not just pay lip service to safety but demonstrate and confirm 
their commitment in the practical decisions they take during the preparation and conduct of an 
investigation, in evaluating its results as well as in generating, approving and implementing the 
corrective actions. 
10. During this study, some existing barriers, bottlenecks and emerging traps in the event 
investigation process were identified and analysed; some methodological and practical 
recommendations were put forward as to how these obstacles could be overcome. 
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Annex A1 
Survey 
of existing practices regarding nuclear event investigation methods, tools and 
techniques 
1. Introduction/background information 
Since recently, the EC JRC-IE has been working on a study of methods and practices currently applied 
in the investigation of abnormal/unexpected events at nuclear power plants. 
To collect information on practical experience with the individual investigation methods currently used 
in the nuclear industry, the following questionnaire has been prepared. The data obtained from the 
questionnaire will be used in drawing up conclusions and recommendations on the most effective 
investigation methods. It should help current and prospective investigators to choose the most suitable 
method for their particular needs. Data contained in the answers should be based on the real situation 
and reflect the personal opinion of respondents. The data obtained from the questionnaire will be kept 
confidential and used for the above purposes only. 
The questionnaire is to be filled in primarily by specialists — licensee or utility staff members directly 
involved in the nuclear event investigation on a full-time or part-time basis. If applicable, the 
questionnaire could be completed also by competent specialists from regulatory bodies, technical 
support organisations, research or consulting institutions or by individual experts directly participating 
in nuclear event investigations or involved in developing appropriate investigation methods and tools. 
2. Questionnaire on nuclear event investigation practices 
Please answer the questions in parts A, B and C below, omitting any questions that are irrelevant or 
confusing. Where applicable, tick the appropriate boxes. If there is not enough space available for your 
answer to a specific question in parts A or B, please use the space provided in part C, indicating the 
part/question number. For questions not relevant to you, please enter ‘N/A’. 
 
Part A. PERSONAL AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This part of the questionnaire is aimed at collecting basic information on the specialists participating in 
nuclear event investigations and how this activity is managed in various countries.  
 
A1. Organisation ………….………………………………………………………………………
……… 
Address ……………………………………………………………Country 
………………………… 
A2. Name of person completing the 
questionnaire ………………………………………………… 
Position …………………………………………………….........................................................
...... 
Email 
address ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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A3. Number of years employed as an incident investigator:   
A4. How long did you work in the nuclear/nuclear safety area before you became an 
event investigator? (number of years) 
 
A5. Percentage of your total working time devoted to incident investigations and 
associated activities:  
 
A6. Number of incident investigations in which you have been involved:  
A7. Have you received formal training in event investigation/root cause analysis 
methods? yes      no  
If so, please specify the type and duration of the course: 
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
........................ 
 
A8. Number of investigators typically participating in an event investigation in your 
organisation: 
 
A9. What is the most common composition of an investigation team (please specify roles, 
functions, positions) (1)……………………………..; 
(2)…………………...……………….; (3)……………….…………; 
(4)…………….……………………; (5)………………………………… 
 
A10. Are external specialists involved in establishing/performing event investigations in your 
organisation? 
• outside experts/consultants from other organisations:  yes, always;   no;  
sometimes, depending on the type of 
incident; 
• corporate investigators from the utility’s central department:  yes, always;   
no;  sometimes, depending on the type 
of incident  
A11. Average duration of an event investigation in your organisation (days) 
………………. (limited apparent cause/specialist/supervisor’s investigations of near-
misses and low-level events should not be taken into account)  
 
A12. Time spent on different activities during the investigation (as a percentage of the 
overall duration of the investigation): 
Planning
Data collection
Analysis
Drafting recommendations/corrective actions
Writing the report
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A13. Who initiates the investigation? (a)  investigators themselves; (b) plant 
management; (c) regulatory organisation; (d) others (e.g. plant committee, 
commission, group — please specify); (e) it is started automatically as required by 
the relevant procedure if preconditions are fulfilled 
 
A14. Please evaluate the following (using the scale ‘insufficient’ 1-2-3-4-5 ‘adequate’): 
14.1. Human resources (personnel available to conduct an investigation) …….; 
14.2. Time available to perform a good quality investigation …….; 
14.3. Managers’ support for investigations ……..; 
14.4. Availability of investigation guidelines/manuals/method (tool) 
descriptions/software to support the investigation ……… 
 
A15. Do you feel that the investigation can be conducted objectively and free of pressures 
aiming to influence the investigation in a particular direction? Yes      No   
If not, please explain why: 
………………………………………………………………………….…………………
…………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
A16. In your opinion, what influence on safety does the event investigation process itself 
have for personnel interviewed or otherwise involved (over and above the final 
report and recommendations)? (Enhanced insight into and attitudes towards safety, 
increased awareness and improved competencies, discovery of unknown 
dependencies between different functions or departments, etc. should be 
considered). 
(a) positive; (b)  no influence; (c)  negative 
 
A17. In what area(s) has the event investigation been most beneficial for your 
plant/organisation: (a) reducing maintenance costs; (b) improving equipment 
availability; (c) improving equipment reliability; (d) reducing operating costs; 
(e) increasing nuclear safety; (f)  improving environmental protection; (g)  
other (please specify)……………………………... 
 
A18. Are there national regulatory requirements of any sort regulating event 
investigation in your organisation? yes    no  
If so, please provide the references of the latest edition of the relevant document 
(please attach a copy of document or indicate the internet address, if 
possible)………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
A19. What international/foreign requirements/guides do you use for event investigation in 
your organisation? (please give references or the internet address if possible) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
A20. Which methodologies are used for event investigation in your organisation? Please 
tick one or more as appropriate: (a)  root cause analysis — RCA; (b) 
probabilistic safety assessment — PSA; (c)  deterministic safety analysis; (d) 
safety culture assessment; (e) other 
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Part B. — INFORMATION ON CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIFIC 
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS METHODS, TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES USED FOR NUCLEAR 
EVENT INVESTIGATION 
The aim of these questions is to collect information about current practices, in order to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of root cause analysis approaches, methods and tools used by nuclear industry 
organisations for nuclear event investigation. 
 
B1. Which RCA (root cause analysis) method(s)1 have you used for event investigation in 
your organisation? HPES, HPIP, HPEP, MORT, ASSET, PROSPER, 
SOL; MTO; AEB;  STEP; PRCAP; CERCA; TRIPOD; HF-RCA; 
3CA; GO method; Fault Graph method; Markov modelling; DYLAM; 
DETAM; other (please specify including reference data if available): 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
 
B2. Which RCA tools and techniques have been used for event investigation in your 
organisation? Event and causal factors charting; Cause and effect analysis; 
Interviewing; Task analysis; Why-why chart; Pareto analysis; Storytelling; 
Change analysis; Barrier analysis; Fault tree analysis; Event tree analysis; 
Causal factor tree analysis; Kepner-Tregoe problem solving; Human factors 
investigation tool; Interrelationship diagram; Current reality tree; REASON®; 
PROACT®; REALITYCHARTING®; TAPROOT®; CAS-HEAR; other 
(please specify including reference data if available): 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
 
B3. How were the RCA methods and tools currently used for event investigation in your 
organisation acquired ( obtained for free; purchased from a vendor; developed 
internally; obtained and then adopted)? 
 
B4. If you have developed any new or existing RCA methods/tools in your organisation, 
please specify the method/tool and briefly describe the development(s): 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
 
B5. For how long have the RCA methods and tools been used in your organisation 
(years)? ....... 
 
                                                 
1  Explanation of acronyms used: HPES — Human Performance Enhancement System; HPIP — Human Performance 
Investigation Process; HPEP — Human Performance Evaluation Process; MORT — Management Oversight and Risk Tree; 
ASSET — Assessment of Safety Significant Event Team; PROSPER — Peer Review of the effectiveness of the Operational 
Safety Performance Experience Review process; SOL — Safety through Organisational Learning; MTO — Man-
Technology-Organisation Investigation; AEB — Accident Evolution and Barrier function; STEP — Sequential Timed Events 
Plotting; PRCAP — Paks Root Cause Analysis Procedure; CERCA — a computer based event investigation method; 3CA — 
Control Change Cause Analysis; HF-RCA — root-cause analysis method of GRS (Germany); GO — method for analysis of 
dynamic systems; DYLAM — Dynamic Event Logic Analytical Method; DETAM — Dynamic Event Tree Analysis 
Method. 
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B6. What factors determined your choice of RCA methods and tools? (a) 
recommendations of the IAEA, WANO; (b) suggestions of the national regulatory 
body; (c) suggestions of management of your organisation; (d) suggestions of 
experienced colleagues; (e) recommendations in literature (please indicate source); (f) 
your previous experience; (g) there was no need for choice — you used methods and 
tools which were in place in your organisation. 
 
B7. What is the degree of methodological definition of RCA methods used for event 
investigation in your organisation: (a)  well defined; (b)  loosely defined; (c)  not 
defined (no methodology — collection of concepts). 
 
B8. Is your organisation currently considering changing the RCA method/tool used? 
(a) yes; (b) no; (c) don’t know. If yes, please indicate the reason for your new 
choice ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Please evaluate the extent to which RCA methods and tools used for event investigation in 
your organisation meet the following criteria.  
RCA methods/tools used2 →       
Criteria  Evaluations ↓ 
B9.1. Clear definition of the problem3 and its significance for safety        
B9.2. Clear delineation of the known causal relationships that 
combined to cause the problem  
      
B9.3. Ability to identify and to establish clearly the causal 
relationships and interdependencies between the causal factors, the 
root causes and the problem defined 
      
B9.4. Clear presentation of the evidence used to support the existence 
of identified causes  
      
B9.5. Clear substantiation of the solutions (proposed corrective 
measures) and explanation of how they will prevent the problem 
recurring 
      
B9.6. Ability to document clearly criteria B9.1 to B9.5 listed above 
in a final RCA report so others can easily follow the logic of the 
analysis  
      
B9.7. Availability of a mechanism for testing logic in establishing 
and analysing causal relationships and interdependencies  
      
B9.8. Time needed for constructing an event evolution model (chart, 
tree, diagram) 
      
B9.9. Accuracy required for constructing an event evolution model 
(chart, tree, diagram)  
      
B9.10. Extent of influence of subjectivity and emotions on output        
B9.11. Suitability to address complex system-wide issues (without 
need to involve other RCA methods and tools) 
      
B9.12. Extent of training and professional expertise needed for the 
RCA method to be mastered  
      
B9.13. Level of automation, i.e. availability of specific software for 
creating charts/diagrams, categorisation, analysing causes, 
performing integrity checks, generating reports (universal software, 
such as MS Office, is not taken into account)  
      
B9.14. The potential level of scope of the investigation — suitability 
to analyse events, influenced by: 1 — the work and technological 
system; 2 — the staff level; 3 — the management level; 4 — the 
company level; 5 — the regulator and association level; 6 — the 
government level 
      
B9.  
B9.15. How would you rate the effectiveness of the RCA 
methods/tools used? 
      
                                                 
2 Please enter the names/acronyms of the RCA methods and tools used for event investigation in your organisation in the 
cells to the right and then your evaluations in the cells below. The scale ‘bad, low’ 1  2  3  4  5 ‘excellent, high’ should be 
used (except for question B9.14). 
3 A ‘problem’ is not only an incident or event; it can be a deviation, a non-conformance, an ‘issue’ or obstacle that makes it 
difficult to achieve a desired safety objectives. 
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Part C. — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
C1. What other strengths and weaknesses of RCA methods and tools used could you indicate?  
Methods/tools 
used 
Strengths Weaknesses 
   
   
   
   
   
 
C2. Hints for improvement. What further needs for the development or improvement of RCA 
methods and tools could you indicate?  
Methods/tools 
used 
Suggestions for development or improvement 
  
  
  
  
  
 
C3. Any other comments concerning existing event investigation practices 
 
C4. Please give your overall opinion and any suggestions concerning this questionnaire  
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